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MEMORABLE

PREDICTIONS,

OF

THE LATE EVENTS IN EUROPE.

25-10

EXTRACTED

FROM THE WRITINGS

OF

✓
ALEXIS EUSTAPHIEVE, ESQUIRE.

Extracted from the writings of Alexis Eustaphie, Esquire.


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BOSTON :

PUBLISHED BY MUNROE AND FRANCIS,

NO. 4, CORNHILL,

1814.

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PUBLISHERS' LETTER TO MR. EUSTAPHIEVE.

Boston, June 30, 1814.

Sir,

HAVING been the publishers of all your larger works in this country, we propose, if you consent, to make a collection of such extracts from your political and literary essays as appeared to anticipate the late glorious events, by which they are so amply verified. In so doing, we only intend justice to yourself, by presenting together what, if detached, might be lost in the mass of political writings ; and justice to the publick, by furnishing, as we conceive, useful information, derived from the facts and reasonings upon which all your predictions have been founded. With regard to the degree of interest which our undertaking may command, and upon which our personal advantages must depend, we have only to observe, that many of your prophetick speculations, made at times when it was impossible to prove their veracity, must have been overlooked ; and consequently would be perused now with all that pleasure which must arise from the certainty of their extraordinary fulfilment. We have also reason to suppose, that many short essays, equally successful, have appeared from your pen in the different newspapers of the day, during the progress of the late astonishing campaigns ; and therefore take the liberty of requesting you to enable us to add them to the intended collection, that the whole may appear in the form of a respectable pamphlet. In hope of obtaining your permission for the above undertaking, we remain

Yours, &c. &c.

MUNROE & FRANCIS.

Alexis Eustaphieve, esq. Boston.

THE ANSWER.

Messrs. Munroe & Francis,

Gentlemen,

I HAVE received your letter of the 30th ult. and thank you sincerely for the flattering manner in which you have noticed my humble efforts. As regards the request you make, after some reflection and due consultation with my friends, I have no hesitation to accede to it, and to furnish you with all such essays as remain in my possession, with the more readiness as I wrote nothing anonymously or in the newspapers, which I meant to disavow, or should blush now to acknowledge. It is possible that my consenting to your proposal may expose me to the imputation of egotism ; neither would I, by an affectation of humility which cannot impose upon any one, place myself so far above human nature, as to deny that the pleasure I feel, from the consummation of the late splendid events, is wholly free from that self-gratification which may be placed on the score of vanity. But the candour which dictated this confession, will, I hope, strengthen my claim to be believed when I declare that I do not arrogate to myself either a gift of prophecy, or superiour talent and knowledge ; but that consequently, my chief and strongest motive, in consenting to your request, is more urgent and of a higher character.

A formidable, and I may say, unprincipled set of men, here and in England, have combined systematically to vilify and depreciate the Russian character and resources. I have dared singly to enter the list against these Goliaths ; not because I have presumed, or have mistaken my pigny strength ; but because I well knew, they reasoned less from ignorance than inclination, upon false data furnished altogether by foreign writers, of whom the most favourable to the Russian character have treated it with some degree of injustice. Even Sir Robert Wilson, of whom the Russians have the least to complain, has mistaken the humble, modest, and retiring deportment of the Russian inferiour officers, whose poverty and difference of rank precluded his personal knowledge of them, for their want of education, and ignorance of military duty, the knowl-

edge of which they have since practically and so preeminently proved. While my antagonists, or rather the enemies of my country, trusted exclusively to foreign authorities, garbled to their own purposes, I looked for mine into the archives of the Russian empire ; and there, in the pages of truth, I found my triumph. I am willing, therefore, you should shew by your collection, how far I have been right ; and how far my opposers, have been wrong ; that it may be known how far *native Russian authorities ought to be preferred*, and Russia restored to the common privilege of all nations, hitherto denied her, *of being represented by her own historians*, and of *being heard in her own defence*.

This is my main object, which, if attained, will amply reward my labour. I dare now to hope, that it will be attained ; and wishing you all possible success in your undertaking, remain,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and devoted,

ALEXIS EUSTAPHIEVE.

Boston, July 6, 1814.

PREDICTIONS,

&c. &c.

AS far back as May 1812, when the event of the Russian war was of itself a prophecy as yet to be fulfilled, the author published his "Resources of Russia;" a work so amply verified in all its anticipations as to become almost a history of what was foretold in it. It is so well known here and in Europe, that we shall make but a few extracts from it, merely presenting the author's deduction from the facts previously laid down. After shewing the means of defence which Russia possessed, he concludes thus :

"And shall the increased resources of Russia—shall her prowess, so often tried and grown to maturity, be now deemed so little, as to excite no respect, and no confidence? Shall her advantages and her reputation, the laborious acquisition of years, be in a moment surrendered at the shrine of that terriffick idol, which the name of France has set up for universal worship and adoration? Has the prosperity, bequeathed by Peter the Great to his country, so little solidity in it, that the first bold invader may, if he pleases, pull it down, like some gorgeous overgrown fabrick, too heavy for its puny and slender foundation? *No! Impossible! The enemy that hopes to conquer Russia, on her own territory, must be prepared to pay in tenfold measure for each drop of blood she sheds, and for each groan that may be extorted from her.* Before she falls, every one of her 700,000 warriors, and more, if necessary, must be destroyed; and

every one will be preceded by many a foe to his grave. The Russian soldier, ever since he has been invested with that name, has not once yet flinched from combat, and ere he dies, in a cause so dear, *will execute such revenge, as in a short time will leave the enemy no victims to feed it.*"

Having removed all doubts as to Russian loyalty, and refuted the general notion of *foreign influence* in Russia, he comes to the following conclusion :—

" In short, among the causes which may operate against Russia, foreign influence and corruption, which to be effectual must be extensive, *are the least to be feared* ; while on the opposite side, she has many sources yet unexplored, and perhaps unsuspected. It is probable, *that the extremity of distress would only make Russia better acquainted with her own strength ; at all events, she is certain of commanding all that invincible force, which enthusiasm can impart, and exalted patriotism can inspire.*"

The next, in vindicating the military character of Russia, has the following prediction literally verified.

" The last campaign in Poland, distressing as it was to the French, is *nothing to what they must experience, if they dare again to invade it.* At that time the sudden overthrow of Prussia enabled them to seize on many fine and fertile provinces, which furnished them with necessary supplies ; but *which are now exhausted, or will be prevented from furnishing any.* The more men Buonaparte brings with him, and the farther he penetrates into Russia, the nearer he will draw to the fate of Charles XII. Again the Russian peasants will be removed, again their habitations will be destroyed, and again whole fertile regions will be, for safety, converted by the Russians into a barren wilderness. The French, if they advance, will see nothing but the Russian bayonets bristling in front, and receding only to strike with surer aim ; nothing but fugitive Cozaks hanging on their wings, who, used to this distressing mode of warfare, will harass them by day and night ; and nothing behind or around them but sterility, famine, and desolation."

The work ends with the following prophetic effusion.

“ Let, therefore, France buckle on her armour ; and in hostile array march against Russia. Let clouds, portending disaster, gather on ; and the threatening tempest again spread wide its rapid wings, and pour its deluge upon the north ; Russia undismayed awaits, nay, invites the blow. Next to Providence, she relies on the tried heroism of her people ; and on the prayers of the suffering millions, whose champion she now stands forth. *Her struggles will be against universal tyranny ; and her success will be the deliverance of all. Her safety will be the protection, and her independence the relief and security of the oppressed. Her cause is the cause of freedom ; and every soil, trod by the foot of a freeman, shall yield to it a tribute of sympathy. Her cause is the cause of humanity ; and wherever man draws the breath of life, blessings shall be its enviable portion.*

“ *It is with Russia that the fallen nations can ever hope to rise. The frowning idol, under whose iron foot numberless victims daily expire, may yet be hurled from its ensanguined throne, and awe the world only by its tremendous ruins !* The overgrown colossus, from whose fatal grasp Europe in vain strives to free herself, can only on its own element be crushed. The thunder of Albion has only struck at its shadow on the ocean ; but the huge substance, in which all the ingredients of mischief are consolidated, still remains the same. Some of the distant sparks have only been intercepted ; while the main furnace, wherein such horrid conflagrations are engendered, still remains unextinguished. Even in the regions of the now respiring Lusitania, only some of the monster’s limbs have been shattered ; the enormous body is still animated with life and vigour, is still fed by daily torrents of human blood, and endowed with the unnatural power of renovating and increasing its strength at pleasure. To assault its extremities is only to provoke its rage and fury ; but *to encounter it at once, in all its dimensions, heart to heart, is the only chance of destroying it. This may yet be hoped from the invasion of Russia.*”

This tract at its first appearance, was generally considered as the very height of extravagance ; and the author, as if aware that

in case of its successful realization, it would still be thought a mere chance or a lucky hit, prepared himself, instead of watching in anxious silence the commencement and progress of the war, to support his claim to foresight by occasional comments, on the correctness of which we shall presently enable our readers to decide.

The reiterated reports of the famous imaginary conspiracy in Russia, better known as "the plot of Speransky," first attracted his notice ; and notwithstanding the imposing aspect of those reports, commanding general belief, he had the courage to insert in the *Boston Gazette* of June 22, 1812, the following remarks, which were soon after completely verified, positive intelligence having been received from St. Petersburg, by the official Russian characters in this country, of the acquittal and innocence of Speransky and his supposed accomplices.

"The article which alludes to a conspiracy against the Emperor Alexander, and which has appeared in various papers, with some pretensions to authenticity, carries within itself the presumptive proofs of its spurious origin, and cannot be credited by any one acquainted with Russian affairs.—The general and desultory statement of an event so important, while matters of less consequence are fully detailed, must necessarily excite distrust, which is still further increased by an attempt to glance at some circumstances, no less contradictory than improbable, which are said to have attended that event. A conspiracy of 200 men is not likely to succeed ; nor is it of a nature to attract the notice and interference of French agents, too skilful and expert to embark in a cause, which, from its extent, could not but miscarry. Moreover, as all the revolutions in Russia have been effected upon grounds exclusively national, and by men, who, in rank and property, before they can conceive so bold a design, must be placed above the temptation of a paltry sum alleged to have been expended by the French minister ; there is strong reason to doubt the existence, or at least the extent and successful exercise of foreign influence on the present occasion. It is well known that the French Ambassadors, notwithstanding his expensive efforts to ingratiate himself with the Russian public, has never been admitted to the private circle and social board of the nobility ; and it

is only from those who were immediately connected with the administration that he received any flattering attention. The Empress dowager, besides, is a professed enemy of the French. It is she that refused her daughter's hand to Napoleon, who opposed, every interview between him and Alexander, and constantly laboured to destroy every vestige of French influence at the Court of St. Petersburg ; it is therefore extremely improbable that the French Government, if it had the means of originating and organizing the supposed conspiracy, would exert those means in favour of its sworn and mortal foe, and against a Prince to whose individual and almost solitary friendship it owed its temporary influence. Nor would this be the order of succession, of the violation of which the Russians are extremely jealous. Alexander has three younger brothers, who, in the event of his dying without issue, would certainly succeed him in preference to his mother, but who all have imbibed from her the same laudable detestation of French principles and usurpation. *In short, the article in question, either in its details or in toto, must be considered a wilful and wanton fabrication."*

While the apparently successful invasion of Buonaparte, and the first unfavourable report of the battle of Mojaïsk or Borodino, created general despondency, our author stood forth as a public consolator in the various pieces which we shall present to the reader, and the first of which, entitled " The state of war in Russia," appeared in the Boston Gazette of November 19, 1812, breathing the same prophetic spirit, undismayed by unfavourable appearances.

" Although, at the present moment of public anxiety, when doubts and apprehensions perplex the mind, and expectation lingers without relief, it is unwise and even cruel to raise false hopes ; yet it is no less criminal to suppress those which might be reasonably indulged. Laudable incredulity, and cautious reception of favourable reports, ought in justice to be extended to those of a contrary tendency, resting on no better foundation. Of this last kind, is the letter so extensively circulated, said to be from an intelligent Bostonian, passenger on board the Lark. It is altogether predicated

on the suspicious article in the *Moniteur* ; and therefore it deserves not the name of document, being the "mere shadow of a shadow." At most it is the *ipse dixit* of an apparently prejudiced individual, in direct contradiction to facts ; as it pretends to state a general distrust in England of the measures of the Russian government, at the very moment that the unerring Barometer of commercial intercourse, shewing the rapid and still increasing amelioration of the course of Exchange, indicates the progressive rise of public confidence. It is true that England is not free from the locusts hatched by the application of Gallic heat : from those volunteer slaves, who are proud to wear the tinselled livery of the Imperial Corsican, and who of course will seize with avidity on every refuse which may serve for the banquet of their gracious master. They will rather doubt the Gospel, than a single word in that monstrous compound of fiction, and distortion of facts, known by the name of *French Bulletin* ; but the thinking, and, I may say, honest men in Great Britain as well as here, who seek for information themselves, are not so easily persuaded to shrink from imaginary victories, or weep at imaginary defeats. These know from the diplomatic correspondence between the courts of Thuilleries and St. Petersburg, and from the attitude of defiance assumed at the time by Russia, that this latter power *has not been inevitably compelled* to engage a powerful adversary without adequate resources, commensurate preparations, and correspondent resolution to persevere in the contest. They know from the same source, that even the treaty of Tilsit, so much blamed because so much misunderstood, was a salutary measure, a wise expedient to gain time, and a positive political advantage obtained at the expense of France, independent of many other considerations which tend to justify it, but which do not come within the scope of the present discussion. They also know, from the proclamation of Alexander, issued at Drissa, *that the fate of Moskow would not be the fate of the Empire ; that the possession of this ancient capital of Russia would by no means insure the successful career of the enemy, nor command submission from the supposed vanquished, who, in yielding it, would only protract a determination, so often wished, to follow with firmness the system originally adopted.*

"So far from desponding, there is every reason to hope the best result from the present posture of things in that quarter. It would be unjust and ungrateful to doubt the prowess of the Russians, and the integrity of their Sovereign, after so noble, and I may say a matchless retreat exhibited to the world, and so many gigantic sacrifices voluntarily made, with a view to a prospective and final benefit. Complicated and prodigious, as is the power of Bonaparte in gaining, as well as inventing an imposing train of brilliant achievements, he has not yet been able to satisfy any impartial man, any one who has not been sworn to worship and adore him, as a being infallible, omnipotent, and "supereminent," that he has obtained any single advantage over the Russian armies but what was resigned to him from motives of policy, and what amounts only to the privilege of advancing farther into the jaws of famine, and the vortex of hostile elements, ready to contend with him.

"But the battle of Mojaïsk is to decide every thing—it may, or it may not. The Russians probably will fight there; they may retreat, and Napoleon may get to Moscow; but have they not retreated before? Have their armies been broken in the retreat? It is these armies, and not Moscow, that he must conquer, ere he can hope for the successful accomplishment of his daring views. The Russians are prepared to give up their capital, rather than risk all their forces in one battle; and this is sufficient for every purpose of hope and consolation. As to the report in the Moniteur, God grant it may be true. In all cases we expect Napoleon will claim victory; but if in this one he has adopted a new method of announcing it, preferring a private to an official communication, as none without his sanction could have been received within the space of sixteen days, I say again, God grant it may be true; for there will be no doubt of his having the worst side of the battle in question.

"I cannot conclude without an attempt to dispel the fears generally entertained of corruption among the Russian nobility. They have more to lose by treachery, and more to gain by loyalty. Their national pride and predilections never can brook submission to a foreign power. They never yet have betrayed their country; and it is unjust and ungenerous to suspect foreign influence where it never yet has shewn itself to any alarming extent. Their lives

and fortunes have been cheerfully offered, and therefore their individual passions and personal ambition are already engaged in the present contest. In short, *they are entitled to the utmost confidence of every brave, loyal and virtuous nation.*"

The author's next article in vindication of the Russian military talents, and headed "Russia wants able commanders," appeared in the *Centinel* on the 2d of December 1812. Though the facts therein contained could not have been denied, the reasonings and anticipations engrafted on those facts, were much doubted, and only now are or ought to be fully acknowledged :—

"Accident and a peculiar combination of circumstances, temporary in their nature, frequently give birth to opinions which in the progress of time attain a degree of permanency totally unexpected ; and, while their original source is lost in the receding darkness of the past, they become, by a constant process of degeneration, habitual and confirmed prejudices, so deeply rooted as to withstand the most impressive evidence of strong and unquestionable facts. Of this kind is the notion generally entertained on the European Continent, that *England* is incapable of becoming a military nation, her soldiers being deficient in skill and destitute of valour ; a notion which under the sinister influence of *France* has gained such strength as to make it doubtful whether it may not survive the brilliant career of Lord Wellington, having already triumphed over the decisive proofs exhibited in *Egypt* and on the plains of *Maida*. A notion equally spurious, (cherished, in turn, by certain classes in *Great-Britain*, and highly prejudicial to the Russian Commanders, whose military character is thereby depreciated, and whose talents are systematically denied in face of solemn facts and unerring experience,) has been transplanted into the American soil, where, particularly in the hot-bed of Gallic corruption, it has grown so prodigiously strong that the hand of a Giant may well despair of plucking it by the root. In vain Romantzows * van-

* The celebrated Russian General, who, with 17,000 men defeated a Turkish army at Kahul, in Moldavia, upwards of 100,000 men strong.

quish the tenfold hosts of foes—In vain Potemkins triumph over hostile towns and nations.—In vain the invincible Souwarow perches like an Eagle on the Alpean Summit, soars above all combination of European skill and discipline, subdues Nature, tramples upon Treachery, and, after a resistless flight over barriers to any other mortal insurmountable, shapes his course homeward, and there, unconquered, reposes on the bed of glory.—These toils and these feats of science and valour are in one instant forgotten ; and Russia, who was already placed on the highest eminence of military reputation, is all at once swept down by the tide of public opinion, and however unjust and ungenerous this opinion, finds herself under the mortifying necessity to earn again the laurels which she had already earned, and again contend for the height which was already in her possession. Austria, exhibits now to the world soldiers overcome, armies broken, Generals surrendered, and her national or political energies destroyed ; still she is not denied to have able Commanders, and her military skill is not questioned. Even Prussia, annihilated at a blow, is treated with the same generosity, and, I may say justice. Russia alone, it seems, cannot obtain any credit for her officers, and her military system, at the very moment that she is the only Continental power which has been able to encounter the terrific Colossus of Europe without dismay, without dishonour, without being injured. After a horrible and gigantic contest protracted to the utmost limits of human endurance, she has alone preserved her independence, and she alone can say with truth, *that her armies never were dispersed, her commanders were never circumvented, and her soldiers never surrendered* ; though a force doubly and triply superior assailed them under the pressure of every natural and accidental disadvantage, which could not be foreseen, and could only be remedied by the most determined, yet well directed, valour. Such was her perilous and unprecedented situation in the last campaign, in the year 1807, that could she have exchanged it with the enemy, her prowess and skill would have been immediately questioned for not annihilating him ; for not doing that, the neglecting of which on his part, or not being able to accomplish, has procured him fulsome praise and adulation. He was commended on the very ground on which she would have

been inevitably condemned. Strange perversity ! Inconceivable infatuation !

“ When the present contest commenced, a contest still more tremendous than the former, all the exotic doubts were revived and ill-boding prophecies were loudly reechoed throughout the Union ; and even the fear generally entertained, that Alexander would fight too soon, being removed by his defensive system of operation, was succeeded by an apprehension of an opposite nature, by which the very measure so much wished and approved, was magnified into the final accomplishment of conquest, and the subjugation of Russia.

“ The recent honourable retreat of the Russians, inasmuch as a retreat must ever be a trial of skill and not of strength, ought of itself to set the question at rest as to the Russians “ being in want of able leaders.” It is however no more than justice to go farther, and to say, that with the exception of the individual superiority of Bonaparte, the Russian Generals have uniformly proved their superiority over all the rest of his commanders. The facts which admit of no reasoning will fully support this assertion. Massena was defeated by Essen at Warsaw, though the former had the advantage of numbers. Bernadotte was beaten at Mohrungen by Prince Bagration, who in the present campaign has in the same way triumphed over the different French Generals opposed to him. Wingteistein has also defeated Oudinot and St. Cyr in two encounters ; while Tormasow routed Regnier, and Count Pahlen repulsed the main body under Bonaparte himself. This superiority further enhanced by the disparity of numbers, cannot be accidental, but proceeds from the regular education of the Russian officers, fitting them from their infancy for military service, and joining sound theory to subsequent experience.

“ It is certain that since Alexander’s reign no success has ever been obtained over the Russians but where Bonaparte himself commanded. When we consider, the forces of whole Europe, brought against Russia, under the absolute control of the greatest General of the age ; not to be in an instant annihilated is of itself a convincing proof of skill in those who oppose them. I say skill, because in the contention of such enormous armies, it is skill altogether,

and not personal valour that decides the victory. To fall before an enemy so powerful and exhaustless in resources would be no dishonour ; but to check him even for a moment is a high military achievement which no sophistry can deprecate, and which Russia has effectually done at the battle of Pultusk and Eylau. *Her efforts therefore to do more, are entitled to our full confidence ;* and if she fall, it will be by a decree of providence, and not from want of able leaders. *She will not have to reproach herself with timidity or domestic treachery ;* for she will do all that is within the scope of human means to effect against a supernatural power."

The 18th bulletin at length was received, and drew from the author the following remarks, inserted in the "Repertory and General Advertiser," December 4, 1812.

"The long expected Phantom from which many, even in anticipation, shrunk with dismay and terror, has at length reached us in the shape of the 18th Bulletin. Terrifick as is its aspect, we will approach it without fear, and by removing the frightful drapery which envelopes it, boldly examine of what character and description is its real nature and substance. Battle and victory have long been synonymous terms in the French Bulletins ; and Napoleon's claiming a victory whenever he announces a battle is only a compliance with a premeditated system invariably pursued, surprising and astonishing only by the fearful credulity with which it is generally received, notwithstanding the knowledge and repeated experience of its falsehood. *The usual characteristics or proofs of victory, are dispersion of the enemy ; his loss far exceeding that of the victor ; his battalions taken ; his Generals destroyed or made prisoners ; his weapons and colours abandoned to the Conqueror, and above all, the rapid and destructive pursuit of the remnant of his broken forces.* This is the touchstone by which the battle of Moskwa shall be tried.

"We read in the bulletin of the King of Naples' deciding the victory by passing thro' the breaches made by 80 pieces of cannon in the Russian columns, and thereby causing the dispersion of those columns. If by dispersing them, Napoleon means to say, *they escaped beyond his reach,* we agree with him in his construction of the word ; it is perfectly warranted by the subsequent attempt at gues-

sing what has become of them, for we find that the conqueror of the day after having *annihilated* the enemy, is so absolutely in the dark about their fate, that he cannot give us any other account of them, than what has been furnished by a Polish renegade, who, himself, knowing nothing, and having no other means of obtaining knowledge, collects all his information from the Russian recruits ! So that a poor ignorant Russian Peasant, left on the field of battle, is the only authority on which Bonaparte has to rely in his accounts of the vanquished Russians. Is this the way in which a conqueror would announce the fate of those whom victory must have placed in his power ?

“As to the proportionate loss on both sides, as we have no Russian account to help us, we can estimate it fairly by recurring to the former statements of the French ; and as the greatest loss they ever acknowledged was at the battle of Eylau, we will make it our guide on the present occasion.

“The nominal loss of the French, that is, acknowledged by them in that horrible battle, was 1 general and 3 colonels killed, 1 marshal 1 general and 3 colonels wounded, and 6700 killed and wounded. The Russian loss as stated by the French is 7000 killed and from 12 to 15,000 prisoners, 45 pieces cannon, and 18 standards, neither of which were in reality taken. When it is considered that the advantages so peremptorily claimed and the losses acknowledged on their part, were in a battle decidedly unfavourable to them ; when it is further authenticated that the real loss of the French was near 40,000 men in killed and wounded, and that of the Russians 20,000 including the wounded ; what must we think of a battle in which the French for the first time acknowledge the loss of 10,000 men, 5 generals killed, and 3 wounded ; while on the other hand they loosely state the loss of the Russians between 40 or 50,000 men, (only 30,000 are accounted for) 60 pieces of cannon, and no standards at all.—

“As to Battalions taken, Generals killed, or surrendered, and the number of prisoners, we find in the whole Bulletin nothing beyond a general assertion. Not a single regiment is mentioned as having surrendered, not a single Russian General or officer of rank is named among the slain ; and two or three are said to have been wounded, merely on the spurious authority of the above mentioned

renegado, who only heard it from a raw Russian recruit. Not a single standard is taken, which is a marvellous exception to all French victories ; and the number of cannon, evidently stated at random, when compared with former exaggerated accounts, must dwindle into nothing ; the more so as the Russian batteries are said to have been taken. There is a curious confession in the bulletin that the Russians removed their artillery in the rear, *which shews they were not acting as if they were beaten*, otherwise they could not have had time to deliberate, and carry their purpose into execution.

“ But coming to the last and most decisive of all proofs, we ask why has not Bonaparte pursued the fugitives, and delayed the possession of Moskow ; an object for which he so desperately contended, and the successful accomplishment of which, at this advanced season, must have been of infinite importance to him ? True, a private letter from Paris, states, that he was at Moskow ; but private letters are no authority, and if they were, new battles which the Russians are stated therein to have fought since the last, would only shew that they were far from being conquered ; *that they only contended from the desire of making Moskow a dear prize, and not from the desperate resolution of saving it at all hazards. They fought to weaken the enemy, to make his progress slower ; and not to prevent him from advancing with his whole forces, which could only be done by risking all their means at once.* The execution of a plan of such magnitude must necessarily be protracted as to time ; nay its very success must depend altogether upon delay : It is, therefore, in perfect unison with the continued and masterly retreat of the Russians ; and explains the political *necessity of their allowing the enemy rather to go to Moskow after a partial resistance ;* than by a premature valour and decisive opposition ruin a system so wisely preconcerted.

“ There is a certain expression in the bulletin, implying that the battle was fought in the rear of Mojaïsk, which in its relative position to the French army, must have been understood between Mojaïsk and Moskow. If this be correct, and there is an admission that the Russians had renewed the attack, it is not improbable that the French, having at first penetrated beyond Mojaïsk, *were afterwards driven back to it in a very different character from the one they have assumed.* The probability is by no means diminished by

the suspicious and unusual manner in which the *Moniteur* has announced the battle, evidently known at Paris long before its official promulgation. It seems upon the whole that the reputation of any one for judgement would not be injured by his venturing to predict that *the Russians will claim victory in this very battle ; and that Te Deum at St. Petersburg as well as Paris, will be sung on the same occasion."*

When the news of the Capture of Moskow was first received and produced immoderate exultation among the American friends of Bonaparte, the author again addressed the public through the medium of the *Boston Gazette*, December 10th 1812.

"It is now certain, that the Russians, so far from being defeated, have obtained a positive advantage over the enemy, by compelling him to fall back several miles, with a loss of 40,000 men killed and wounded, a considerable number of prisoners, several pieces of cannon and standards. The victors remained three days on the field of battle, burning the dead and removing the wounded, which explains at once the contradiction of language and the obscurity of date in the 18th Bulletin, as well as the informal annunciation of the battle at Paris. For three days, that is, as long as the Russians kept the field, Napoleon could not date the Bulletin according to his wishes ; and waited, until by their retreat, Mojaïsk being abandoned, he took possession of it, and headed his Bulletin accordingly. That the Russians, after a victory so dearly purchased, (they acknowledge the loss of 30,000 killed and wounded) should deem it prudent to retreat, and even abandon Moskow, rather than risk another battle with an enemy who was reinforced before them, shews the absurdity of the idea entertained by many, that one general engagement must necessarily decide the fate of Bonaparte or the Russian empire. The Russians, by their voluntary sacrifices, have evinced their unconquerable resolution to await with patience, and deserve by perseverance, *the ultimate decree of heaven in their favour*, while their sovereign, penetrated with their zeal and devotion, has already redeemed the pledge he had given, not to listen to any insidious proposals of peace from the enemy. The contest has now assumed a different and a more awful character. On one hand a loyal people contend for their liberty and existence ; on the other, an insatiate

conqueror has staked all his conquests, his crown, his reputation, and his life, on the issue. Already disappointment breaks out in his Bulletins. In vain he announces the capture of muskets, cannon, wine and other luxuries ; the 18th Bulletin, if there were no other, by convincing the most incredulous how far he can push his unblushing falsehood, deprives him on this occasion of every chance of deceiving. No one can suppose, that the Russians, while they were able to remove every thing of value, should leave their gallant brothers and defenders to perish in the flames. Thank God ! they have not learned yet the art of poisoning their comrades from the invader of Egypt ; *who, ere long, will find these very sons of Russia, who, he says, were abandoned by her, arrayed in arms against him, and exacting a dreadful vengeance for the destruction of their capital, and desolation of their country. We shall soon see, how little even a Bonaparte can do against famine, ruin, and the united enthusiasm of a nation determined to defend itself to the last extremity.*"

"The Repertory and General Advertiser" of December 15th 1812, contains also the following notice concerning "General Kutuzow" from the pen of our author, in his usual spirit of prophecy.

"Prince Kutuzow, descended from an ancient Russian family, is the illustrious remnant of the veterans who shed such lustre over the reign of Catherine the Second. He it was that made the celebrated retreat before the battle of Austerlitz, in which, to the regret of Russia and the world, his powers, as a commander in chief, were not fully exercised. He always retained the confidence of the nation ; and never ceased to be the darling of the soldiers, the pride of the citizens, and the oracle of the nobles. When the enemy, contrary to general expectation, directed his desolating course towards Moskow, and the nobility, with their usual zeal and patriotism, charged themselves with the main burden and responsibility of war, on the condition of being allowed to appoint their own commander ; Kutuzow was unanimously proposed, and the choice, which he afterwards so nobly justified, was confirmed by the emperor. After sustaining the dreadful shock of the whole French force, the Prince turned upon the enemy, and finally drove this boasted conqueror of Europe from

the field of battle ; finding, however, his own loss to be very great, and his army reduced, while the enemy received strong reinforcements from the Vistula, he shewed prudence equal to valour, and rather than risk solid advantages for the transient eclat of fame, he abandoned Moskow, and with his victorious army retired to another position, admirably chosen within 20 miles of Moskow. This position covers the main roads from Moskow, protects the important cities of Kaluga and Toula (the latter is the armoury of the empire) and secures the interior country in the rear, which is the Russian granary, and the land from which the principal supplies are drawn. Bonaparte's eagerness, on which the Prince justly calculated, to get possession of Moskow, has withdrawn all the intervening force between the latter and Tormasow who had advanced upon Smolensk ; so that by a single movement to the left, judiciously effected, the flank as well as the whole line of communication between Poland and the French at Moskow is menaced. Bonaparte dares not take the road to St. Petersburg, as by such a step the whole Russian army would be placed in his rear, and his *retreat* completely intercepted ; and as he cannot obtain supplies by means of small detachments, in presence of so superior a force, he must move his whole army upon Kutuzow, and fight for food ; a mode of warfare to which the French have not been used. The destruction of Moskow, by removing the only object for which it was necessary to risk a great battle, has released the Prince from all restraint ; *and henceforth he will fight only when he pleases, and when he is sure of success.* A long residence, with other events, have made Moskow dear to him : and not being taught yet by modern policy to disguise his feelings, he announces the event in a tone of grief which has been mistaken for despondence ; but while he weeps like a man and citizen over the ruins of a beloved city ; he, with the heroism of a soldier, values its voluntary sacrifice *as the pledge of independence—the preservation of honour at the expence of life*—and with the steady eye of an enlightened statesman, contemplates a future Moskow, rising like a phoenix from its ashes, at the moment that the gigantick system, now developing itself, shall have been matured and carried into execution. Already the convoys of the enemy have been intercepted, already numerous corps are organized to act in concert

with the elements and famine. While these hover on his wings, *a fresh army shall be planted between him and France* ; and he soon shall feel, what he begins to fear, *the full effects of that invincible national enthusiasm*, which can, without hesitation, give up to flames the ancient capital of the empire, rather than purchase its safety even by appearance of submission."

When the undisturbed continuance of Bonaparte at Moskow, and the removal of their effects by the inhabitants of St. Petersburg, produced an universal apprehension for the safety of the last imperial capital, the author failed not to relieve our fears by the following article in the Boston Gazette of Dec. 28, 1812.

" *The destinies of the civilized world are now interwoven with those of Russia* ; and the awful contest, on the issue of which depends universal freedom, or universal submission, must excite deep interest in the breasts of the individuals of all nations. Every succeeding intelligence from Europe deserves to be closely examined, compared, and studied, so as to establish a fair balance between our hopes and fears ; and, as the one or the other may prevail, prepare us to encounter the worst, or give us the foretaste of better fortune. While the various and detailed accounts from St. Petersburg, all bearing to the same point, and by their uniformity entitled to our confidence, furnish certain data for reasoning, and lead us to the same conclusion ; the French bulletins, including the last, 23d, issued several days later, by their correspondent tone, and their negative or silent corroboration, place us at once on a well defined ground, from which we can view the surrounding objects, and form our judgment, at least of the present, without fear of error. It being then ascertained that the French have for nearly a month remained inactive at Moskow, the question immediately occurs as to the reasons which induced them to adopt so novel a conduct, and as to the nature of those reasons being favourable or adverse to the common cause of humanity. Is it owing to the lateness of the season ? The winter at Moskow does not shew its rigour till the middle of November, and the rains and snow storms preceding it, had not yet taken place, as according even to the French bulletins, the weather was fair, and " the sun fine," as late as the 9th of October. Is it on account of some pending

negociations ? The voluntary destruction of Moskow, Kutusow's answer to Bonaparte, the first imperial manifesto, where Alexander swears "not to sheathe his sword as long as a single enemy remains in his territories," his declaration subsequent to the destruction of Moskow, but above all his last emphatic expression on the 2d of October, that "every Russian will sooner drain the last drop of misery, than submit to a scandalous peace," are pledges so solemn and unequivocal, as to put any peace, but such as would be consistent with honour, totally out of the question ; and to leave no other alternative to the contending parties but that of a complete victory or a *complete disgrace*. If any thing could further strengthen this, it is the total silence of the French bulletins upon the subject ; as there is no doubt but a prospect of peace, so confidently promised before the battle of Moskwa, and entirely withdrawn after it, would be so welcome to the French exhausted and harassed soldiers, that Bonaparte would not have lost a moment to display it to their longing sight, had he the least hope or chance of fulfilling his promise. Is it because there was no enemy near enough to call for some important movement ? We find that Kutuzow's whole army kept within a few werts of Moskow, and acting upon the flank of the French. Surely it would have been an object of some importance to dislodge the bold intruder, and drive him from his position ; we find, however, that nothing has been attempted against him of any consequence. Is it because Moskow has afforded abundant supplies for the French army, so as to supercede the necessity of seeking for them ? It is now a matter of fact, that every thing had been previously removed from that city, and consequently no resources were left for the enemy, unless it be the image of the Virgin Mary, ornamented with diamonds which is so pompously described in one of the bulletins !! Small parties, detached in every direction, in search of provisions, and uniformly driven back upon the ruins of Moskow, shew *the want of supplies and the necessity of a general movement which alone could attain the object in view*. Besides, the French bulletins themselves prove the scarcity of supplies, by their anxiety to convince the world of the contrary. Whoever has been a constant and attentive reader of these bulletins, knows very well what they announce with particular and repeat-

ed emphasis, in opposition to the apparent state of things, ought always to be reversed. When they say that Bonaparte's person was not exposed in battle, they assert what is a matter of course, what is generally known to be the case, and requires no assertion whatever; in doing so, therefore, they excite the well founded suspicion, which will hereafter turn out to be a fact, that his person was in imminent danger. When they announce that 60,000 muskets were found in Moskow, a thing improbable, as such articles would have been removed in preference to all others, and impossible, as no town in Russia contains at this time so large a quantity, the demand at home being greater than the supply, they merely tell us that they are in want of arms, and remind us of the 160,000 English muskets taken by the French at Koningsberg during the last campaign in Poland, when it is well known, on the authority of the British parliament, that not a single stand was sent there !* Indeed, when they go so far as to proclaim to the world that the French completely routed the Russians on the Moskwa, and counted six Russians to one Frenchman on the field, when they themselves were driven back ten miles, and left the field to the Russians, who were for two days afterwards employed in burying the dead, and removing the wounded; when they assert that the final overthrow of the Russians was prevented by hetman Platow's having covered their retreat, at the time that this aged warrior, as was afterwards proved, was actually pursuing the French; it becomes then our duty to distrust every account furnished by the bulletins, when not supported by corresponding circumstances. No motive was therefore wanting to spur the French to action, as far as supplies are concerned.

“Are there no towns, besides Moskow, of consequence enough to become desirable objects of conquest? Twer and Toula are not only important cities, but might be considered, in Bonaparte's present situation, as indispensable. The first, about 160 miles north of Moskow, on the road to St. Petersburg, commands the whole communication of the Volga, and its possession

* Only 50,000 stand of arms were sent, and these never reached the place.

would not only procure an immensity of supplies of every description, but enable him to distress St. Petersburg, and the whole northern section of the empire, which is more or less dependent upon the southern supplies conveyed up that river ;—the second, about 120 miles south of Moskow, is the armoury of Russia ; the loss of it would be irreparable at this moment, as it would deprive the Russians of the most essential means of carrying on the war ; and yet, strange to tell, though both these towns are so near Moskow, and though the season was acknowledged to be favourable, no effort has been made to secure them, and thereby acquire those great advantages, of the full importance of which it would be injustice to the talents of Bonaparte to suppose him for a moment unconscious.

“After mature consideration of all the above circumstances, and after all the necessary caution in indulging too sanguine hopes, the irresistible and truly gratifying inference is, that Napoleon’s inactivity is a matter of *necessity and not of choice*. His foraging and reconnoitring parties, are scarcely safe under the walls of Moskow ; and so far from undertaking any offensive operations, he is obliged to fortify himself at Kremlin. As long as the admirable and skilfully chosen position of Kutuzow protects the most important part of the Russian empire, and menaces the whole French line of communication, it will be impossible for Bonaparte to take the road to St. Petersburg, and expose his rear ; and consequently his main army to destruction. Were there no force whatever on that road to oppose him, still the impossibility of removing his line farther towards the Baltic, which alone could enable him to advance upon the Russian capital, would prevent him from making the attempt ; unless Witgenstein’s army were destroyed, and Riga taken, events now rendered altogether improbable by his withdrawing Macdonald from that position. When we take an extensive view of the Russian armies, occupying all the principal roads leading to Moskow, and extending a formidable circle around the enemy ; when we consider that Witgenstein’s army, relieved by the absence of Macdonald, must naturally be pushing towards Smolensko, to which point, the centre of the French line of communication, Tormazow’s army is also advancing from the opposite side, so as to place themselves between Bonaparte and his reinforcements from Germany and Poland ; and

Winzengerode's right was actually forming a junction with Kutuzow's left, at Mojaïsk ; we can anticipate no chance of escape for Bonaparte, *except by a desperate retreat*, in which he would have to encounter two armies, one of which already had checked him at Borodino, and the other from Moldavia, consisting of veterans ; and, if united with that of Witgenstein, amounting to, at least, 120,000 men. Even this chance, which it will require his utmost genius to improve, if he remains a fortnight longer at Moskow, will be lost to him by the powerful interposition of the elements. Without therefore offending Providence by confident anticipations, we may entertain the most reasonable hopes of *the final overthrow of the Tyrant*, at whose name the world has trembled so long, and whose overwhelming power has crushed so many inoffending nations. These hopes are still further strengthened by the embarrassing state of his finances. Hitherto he fought for spoils, and after each bloody campaign, returned richer than he went ; but now he is engaged in two sanguinary contests, one in Russia and the other in Spain, neither of which bring him any compensation ; but are a heavy expense and one continual waste of his resources, to repair which he has neither credit at home, nor men possessed of sufficient capital to assist him by loans, as done in Great Britain. He has lived upon plunder, and probably will starve in search of it—a fate which he has amply merited."

About ten days before the news of the French retreat from Moskow, and of Witgenstein's decisive attack upon St. Cyr, had reached this country ; the author in " the Repertory and General Advertiser," Jan. 1, 1813, furnished the public with the following bold yet correct speculations :—

" The main French army, reinforced after the battle of Moskwa, whereby the rear was considerably weakened, is kept in check by Kutusow and Winzengerode, acting in concert towards the point of Mojaïsk, who must be supposed to have been strongly reinforced, and whose strength must at least be equal, since they have been able to confine so enterprising an enemy to Moskow. On the road to Smolensko, we do not find any French force of consequence, unless we turn northward to Riga, where St. Cyr, and Macdonald, command considerable bodies ; but where they have

been successfully opposed and effectually checked by the corps of General Essen, governour of Riga, and the victorious army of Witgenstein; so that even at this point the force on both sides appears equally balanced. The Russians, however, by the inactivity of the enemy, by a greater facility of obtaining reinforcements, can annoy the whole road to Smolensko, in such a manner as to make it both necessary and expensive to keep it open; and * Macdonald has already been detached from St. Cyr, to act upon that road, having been previously reinforced with the remaining reserve from Wilna. As this movement must weaken the French corps before Riga, and expose it to a defeat; General Witgenstein, whose constant reinforcements appear to keep pace with those of the enemy from Wilna, *will immediately attack St. Cyr*, or leave Essen to oppose him, in either case follow Macdonald to Smolensko, keeping the chances of War equal. But the result of equal success, as to the field of battle, is a positive advantage to the Russians, inasmuch as the mere preservation of their positions distresses the enemy, by intercepting his supplies, which nothing less can secure, or restore to former facility, than a complete victory, an event extremely improbable, after the failure of so many previous attempts to dislodge Witgenstein, and after so many trials in which the Russian Generals have uniformly triumphed over the enemy not commanded by Bonaparte in person. Every moment therefore gained by the Russians, even without a victory, is fatal to the French, as it exhausts their resources, and insures the operation of the season, which alone must destroy those resources, at the time when none can, and none has been procured on the spot. The most formidable progress, however, increasing prodigiously the balance in favour of Russia, is that of Tormasow's army, upwards of 80,000 strong, which about the 12th of Sept. had pushed to Pinsk, a town in Volhynia, about 200 miles from Warsaw, 350 miles from Smolensko, almost in a direct line, and 300 miles across to the Baltic, in the rear of Wilna. If this army should remain in that position,

* The papers erroneously announced at this time, that Macdonald was called to Bonaparte's army. The mistake, however, was only in the General's name, as Oudinot actually performed what was here predicted, and his name, substituted for that of Macdonald, will make the above remarks right.

it would menace the enemy's great line of operation ; if it should stretch towards the sea, all the French reinforcements in Germany would be completely cut of ; but if these reinforcements made a desperate attempt, notwithstanding the unfavourable season, to penetrate into Russia, Tormasow would render their assistance useless, by anticipating them, and advancing before them upon Smolensko. This last movement it seems he has already adopted after leaving some garrisons behind to check any force that might attempt to follow him. If Macdonald is strong enough to intercept him, or compel him to take a circuitous route, the road from Smolensko may be opened again, and the contest prolonged : but if he is defeated, which can scarcely be doubted, as by venturing so far he would place himself between Witgenstein who follows him, and Tormasow who is advancing from Pinsk, the fate of Bonaparte would be decided ; as no power on earth could then save him :—*Compelled to a desperate retreat, at a season too the most unfavourable, this rash but till now successful conqueror, would have first to encounter Kutuzow's whole army, and then, if he should escape by sacrificing one half of his own, with the remainder would fall in with the united forces of Tormasow and Witgenstein that would complete his destruction.* Nay, should the more rapid advance of Winter suspend all operations in the rear, and leave things in their present situations ; the same decisive advantages would be secured to the Russians, by the *inevitable starvation of the French at Moskow*, who must fight for their existence, and whose inability to do so, must, consequently, terminate their career. From all these considerations it is evident, that Napoleon, blinded by incessant good fortune, set his crown, fame, and life upon the cast of a die ; that in the vain assurance of dictating to Russia at Moskow, he has committed a most palpable, and it is to be hoped, irretrievable error, in extending his line upon a single narrow road, without any fortified places to support it, and about 600 miles in length, contrary to the most certain and indisputable rules of military science ; that Kutuzow, *justly calculating on his eagerness and imprudent confidence, had left Moskow as a bait for him, and there entrapped him* ; and that finally, if the contest should be settled this winter, it will be so in consequence of the *successful movements in the rear, which excite now more anxiety, and must prove more decisive than even a conflict between the main armies*—which indeed have gained such importance, as to make extremely *hazardous*, if not impossible, the *personal escape of Bonaparte.*”

"The Repertory and General Advertiser" of January 12, 1813, contains the following effusion from the author, on the receipt of the great news of the liberation of Russia :—

"The truly gratifying intelligence from the Russian armies, while it confirms our conjectures and former speculations, confounds at once the hopes and wishes of those who have always sympathized with Bonaparte, and by a constant adherence to his cause, have evinced an ambition to equal him, if not in talents, at least in qualities much less to be commended. It is not, however, our intention to exult over those journals in which Russia was triumphantly announced as already conquered, and that the destruction of her cities, instead of being the pledge of resistance, was the effect of despair. It is not our desire to remind certain Gentlemen of their eager and premature publications of decisive French victories ; or to call for recantation on some, who, because they have been at St. Petersburg, pretend to wield the destinies of the Russian Empire ; detail the most extravagant theories, less practicable than even the Corsican's own project of invasion, and expect, that, at their bidding, nature will change her course, the annual fall of snow diminish, Moskow approach St. Petersburg at least 200 miles nearer, and the Volga take a more convenient direction to enable the French to cut off all communication between south and north, and intercept all the supplies going from the Ukraine to St. Petersburg. No—Our joy is too pure, too dignified to be debased with such alloy. It is enough that in the freedom of Russia, the hopes of the whole world are revived ; and that, should the enemy effect even a successful retreat, she has nothing to fear, and nothing to lose. She has *now to fight, not so much in self defence, as to crush, and, if possible destroy the tyrant who else may prey upon others ; while he no longer contends for conquest, but for personal escape and existence.* Her own safety is established, and her efforts are now directed to the *deliverance of other nations.* Let not the willing slaves of Bonaparte build much upon his "orderly retreat" and safe return home. *Never shall he come back as he went, for he left in Russia the best part of himself, all that colossal and imposing substance which imagination had given him ; and he will henceforth appear but a little, sallow, meagre semblance of a man, such as he is in reality ; nor will he again afford his friends an opportunity of descanting on the miseries and slavery of the Russian*

peasantry, on their state of barbarism and of oppression, only to be relieved by the merciful interposition of a Napoleon !! We shall leave to *others* the consolation of boasting "French skill over Russian strength;" we shall not even disturb the renowned Dr. Clarke in his visions about the depravity of morals, want of patriotism, treacherous disposition, boorish manners, brutal ignorance, superstition, stupidity, dirt and filth, and every thing else equally true and charitable with which he has honoured the Russian nation: but we will just take a peep at the great man, who formerly was seen every where, but who now has dwindled into a dwarf, to be discovered only by the aid of a telescope. * Where he is gone, and where he has hid his shame, no one can tell, and every one wishes to know; we undertake therefore to guess that he has taken the *Smolensko road, for that is the only one that is left him*, and indeed the only one that leads from Moscow. The defeat of *Murat appears to have been the immediate cause of the evacuation of Moscow*; though it is plain from the 24th bulletin, that the advance backwards was already in contemplation. Kutuzow seems to have manœuvred with such skill, rapidity and secrecy, that Bonaparte was first informed of his real designs by the broken legions of his good brother-in-law, whom it was necessary at all hazards to save. It is clear that *Napoleon cannot retreat without a great battle*, or without the permission of Kutuzow. If the latter *feels* strong enough to intercept him, we shall *hear of a dreadful conflict near the place where the other took place*; if not, he will let him pass, and follow him to Smolensko, hanging on his flanks and annoying his rear; and as the *French horses are famished, and the roads are bad, their march will be slow, and the greatest part of their artillery probably will be abandoned*. In this state, constantly galled by the pursuing enemy, they may possibly arrive at Smolensko, where Victor, if he be not previously cut off, may join them with 20 or 30,000 men half starved, and half frozen; which will scarcely replace the losses suffered in the retreat, and constitute the last reserve, inasmuch as Macdonald and St. Cyr being defeated, will be prevented by Wittgenstein's successes from affording any important assistance. This last may even place himself between Bonaparte and Smolensko; but supposing this impracticable, *the French must still fall in with Tchitchagoff's army, which is in the rear of Smolensko*. This General is supposed to have reached Minsk about 21st of October, the very day on which Moscow was evacuated. Being thus placed

* At this time no intelligence of Bonaparte was received. PUBLISHERS.

about 180 miles from the opposite side of Smolensko, if he moves towards it, he will reach it sooner than Bonaparte who has about 250 to go ; but if he should remain at Minsk, *he would command the main Smolensko and Moskow road, by which the French must eventually pass* : and by communicating with Witgenstein at Polotsk, a distance of only 100 miles across, he would completely hem in every French soldier, as if it were in a bay, the entrance to which, between the Dwina and the Dnieper, coming very near each other, would be in his possession. It is more than probable, *that his position, at Minsk will not be abandoned, but rather strengthened with a view to this decisive operation* ; the most certain inference, however, is, that Mojaisk being passed, the great and finishing battle, upon a scale more extensive than ever, will take place at Smolensko, or Minsk, according to Tchitchagoff's order to meet the enemy half way, or to wait for him. If Bonaparte, placed thus between Kutuzow and Tchitchagoff's army, is able to cut *his way through, he will leave one half of his men behind, and return "shorn of his beams ;"* but if he is defeated, he is lost forever. The chances are greatly against him, as nothing short of victory can save him ; while a defeat would only place the Russians as they were. Nay, a drawn battle, the utmost he ever gained over the Russians in the most auspicious circumstances, would now be sufficient to seal his ruin. Even the lateness of the season, by checking operations on both sides, would destroy his army, by the mere privation of supplies, which the Russians might continue to obtain by remaining passive, but which the French cannot without acting offensively. In short, every thing tends to strengthen our belief, that Bonaparte is *approaching the end of his career* ; that he rashly committed himself by going to Moskow ; and that he found, though too late, there are armies beside his own, and Generals, besides himself and his brood, who can successfully launch the thunderbolt of war, and who know how to repel, pursue, and chastise an insolent invader, bringing in his train all the dregs of Germany and all the degraded victims of self-prostitution in Europe."

On the receipt of the 25, 26, 27 and 28th bulletins, where Buonaparte announced and described his retreat, the author inserted in "the Boston Gazette," of Jan. 21, 1813, these pertinent "Remarks." It is needless to observe that the sentences in italics, in this as well as all other articles, are prophecies literally verified.

“ At length, to the utter confusion and dismay of some, and to the joy of others with whom we are proud to associate, the world hears now from Bonaparte’s own mouth, that he has been compelled to quit the capital which bounded his imaginary prospects, and, like some consecrated spot, the moment it was touched, was to convert his golden dreams into reality, and shew Russia prostrated at his feet. The conqueror is conquered. He flies, and is pursued by those very men whom he taxed with cowardice and inability, whom he pretends to have beaten in every encounter, and whose subjugation he had rashly conceived possible. The labour of three months is destroyed by one ; and hundred thousands of lives, for which he must account somewhere, have been sacrificed in vain. His bulletins which record a confession so extorted, so humiliating to himself and his parasites, and so consoling to Russia and those who sympathise in her cause, abound in such admirable specimens of flummery, frivolty, impotent anger, half-stifled admission, half-uttered complaints, sophistry, prevarication, and downright contradiction ; as to surpass all former exhibitions of the same kind, and to convince us how desperate must be the cause which requires such flimsy covering, and how serious the disaster which breaks out through all such contrivances, and braves every effort to conceal it. It was our intention to comment at large upon these incongruous details, detect their falsehood, and expose their absurdity ; but we find it a crude unwieldy mass, to digest which would be a hopeless attempt, and like the Herculean task of cleansing the Augean stables, is much beyond our power. We resign the honour of the undertaking to those who, when the Russians retreated to conquer, proclaimed them as cowards, fighting only by running away ; and who, now that Bonaparte retreats defeated, will no doubt make every exception in his favour, and still trumpet him as the conqueror of the north—to those who rather than fail in their zeal and loyalty, shut their eyes to irresistible conviction, with unblushing impudence denounced the Russian official accounts as forgeries, and like base impostors, pretending to read in futurity, asserted that Bonaparte, having taken Toul and Kaluga, was still at Moskow, and that Russia existed no more ; at the very time when the idol, for whom they so prostituted

ted themselves, was *removing* somewhat against will, to another more comfortable place of worship. Our perfect contempt for these wretches, would not permit us even to expose their depravity, much less to make any reference to them ; but when we enter the temple of the Corsican deity, those who officiate as its priests can alone expound the mysteries, and the ambiguous language of the oracle. We therefore think it proper to leave it to them, to explain, if they dare, the real meaning of the Bulletins, and reconcile, if they can, its numerous contradictions ; as to ourselves, our “ profound cogitations,” with which upon the whole we are well pleased, urge us to lay open all our doubts, however degrading to the god, in order that our conscience may be clear, and our errors expiated on the altar of confession.

“ We are willing to take Bulletin 26th as it is—It tells its own story full as well as could be wished : except, that where Bonaparte talks of the *violation of laws* by the Russians, we are *impious* enough to think of a robber or a thief, who, being forced to restore the stolen goods and undergo a severe castigation, cries out that the laws have been violated in his person !—Nor can we help thinking that a new expedient of going *further* from St. Petersburg, in order to approach it nearer, unless nature has changed its course and brought St. Petersburg to Smolensko, looks very much like an official premeditated, and even unprofitable falsehood ; and much good may it do to the contriver !

“ Bulletin 27th evidently labours to diminish the importance of the battle of Malojarslavitz, and *furnishes conclusive proofs of its decisive termination in favour of the Russians*. Malojarslavitz is to the south of Mojaïsk about 30 miles, and in a direct line from the main Moskow and Smolensko road. The French stepped aside to drive the Russians from that town, and the combat began on the 24th. Bonaparte admits the Russians occupied very advantageous heights, but says they were driven back with great loss ; and yet on the 25th his whole army appeared only in order of battle ; in other words, instead of pursuing, expected to be attacked by a beaten enemy !!! Here suddenly, and no doubt purposely, the account is broken off ; and the reader is carried to Bonaparte at Grodnevo, a village on the main road a few miles northwest of Mojaïsk. Here we find him attacked by 6000 Cossacks, and tho’

he says they were sabred and otherwise destroyed, the admission that they had taken 6 pieces of cannon from a park, which is always in the centre of an army, and the remarkable expression that "at 8 o'clock order was re-established," plainly shew the attack was very important, and that there was disorder, which in the French nomenclature is synonymous with defeat. On the 25th the Emperor went to his army at Malojaroslavitz, to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, the position from which, we were told in the beginning, the enemy was driven back!!! This curious enemy, that seemed to appear where he was not, retreated again, and was *suffered* to do so: but observe, the *humane* conqueror, out of pure compassion, returns on the 26th to Borowsk, and on 27th to Vereja, two towns which lie directly on the line of his *backward* progress to the main road from which he advanced to the attack. *Who does not perceive, that he was beaten and compelled to fall back?* The loss he acknowledges, and the death of his favourite Gen. Deizon, confirm still further this supposition. As to his speculations about the Russian infantry, and grey jackets, they are too ridiculous, and deserve no more notice than his humanity, which, in the 26th bulletin, prevented him from destroying poor Russians by fire!!

"Bulletin 28th gives us a pretty accurate idea of all the horrors and privations which the French have suffered; of the destructive activity with which they were pursued; and of the complete success of Witgenstein, who drove St. Cyr over the Dwina, and crossed the river in pursuit.

"The language of the bulletin, if properly translated, would read thus: St. Cyr beat Witgenstein, but ran away in order to form a junction with Victor, and to beat the beaten Russian at some other time! A child might make out a more consistent story, were it not for the impossibility of getting over the stubborn fact.

"In short, from attentively perusing the French account, *we are convinced the success of the Russians is much greater than they themselves in the first instance claimed.* From the slight way in which Bonaparte mentions the defeat of St. Cyr, we have reason to suppose the defeat of Murat, on which he dwells with such evident chagrin, to be more decisive and extensive in its effects than was at first apprehended. It is further evident that *at Smolensko he is*

as badly lodged and perhaps worse than even at Moskow ; and that no place short of Warsaw or Konigsberg can afford him winter quarters ; to obtain which he must march about 500 miles in the depth of winter, through a Russian army from Moldavia, which was supposed to be posted at Minsk, directly in his front ; and if so, must inevitably intercept him. If he escape safe, two thirds of his army at least, will be left behind ; and no temptation on earth will ever again induce him to invade Russia. Nor will he be able to turn his arms against others, and against Spain in particular ; for the Russians unquestionably will follow him, and every territory he quits in retiring home, will give him a new enemy, whom the terror of his name can no longer hold in passive obedience. Prussia will be reinstated, and Germany, if there be any virtue left in it, will recover its independence."

Reasoning upon the same events in "The Repertory and Daily Advertiser" of January 26, 1813, the author foretels the overthrow and surrender of Napoleon's army, near Smolensko (verified in the defeat and capitulation of Davoust's and Ney's corps,) and also the final destruction of the invader's whole forces, as the price of his personal escape.

"The calculations which we have before made in regard to the movement of the Russian armies are more than realized by the events, and Napoleon is probably pent up in Smolensko, where his army, *reduced by famine, cold, and the repeated attacks of the Russians must be overthrown in a general battle, or capitulate to the Russian General.* It will be seen by Lord Cathcart's despatches, that the town of Malojaroslawitz was taken and retaken eleven times ; and that the retreat of the French in consequence was the most disastrous that can be conceived. The effective force of the main body when they began their retreat was only 85,000 men ; since which time it has met with repeated losses and disasters which have reduced it to less than 60 thousand. Thus in three months, after the invasion of the Russian Empire, by the most arrogant, presumptuous, cruel and villainous of mankind, with the greatest army which the modern world has ever seen ; through the prudence and generalship of Kutuzoff, the bravery of his troops, and the firmness of Alexander, the invading army is nearly annihilated.

“For what is its present situation ?

“On its right hand near Smolensko is General Witgenstein, who after beating St. Cyr at Polotsk and driving him to Lepel, proceeded to join Steinhill and attack both St. Cyr and Victor. He defeated them on the 31st of October, sent forward a detachment to Witepsk, and was joined afterwards by Tchitchagoff near Orsha. On the left of Smolensko the main army, 150,000 strong, under Kutusow, was at Lobkoro on the 13th November. General Platoff had crossed the Dnieper in front of Smolensk. The French are thus completely surrounded and without supplies. The report from Gottenburg that Bonaparte had reached Mohilow with 15,000 men where he met with Admiral Tchitchagoff, is not confirmed by the subsequent accounts from that place announcing the Admiral's junction with Witgenstein. *Desperate as Napoleon's situation must be, he may contrive to elude his enemies and get back to Paris himself—but his army must be destroyed.*”

In the “Boston Gazette” of January 28, 1813, the author in allusion to the same events, and in confirmation of his remarks speaks thus :—

“From the great events that followed, it must be evident to every reflecting and impartial man, that the sanguinary and unprecedented battle of Borodino was decisively in favour of the Russians ; and was the first mortal blow to the towering hopes and the unhallowed ambition of Napoleon, whose every subsequent step led him nearer and nearer to destruction. The victory claimed by Kutusow, marked in the first instance by the enemy's retreat from the field, and doubted afterwards from the circumstance of Bonaparte's being allowed to advance, was not merely negative or unprofitable ; but of such magnitude and positive advantage, as to have enabled that General to redeem every pledge he gave, and to execute one of the most extensive and daring projects that ever was conceived by the genius of an experienced warrior. He was not content to chastise an insolent invader, and barter the future prospects and solid advantages for the present eclat of barren victory ; but looked further, and by having courage enough to bear the imputation of defeat, and seemingly to yield to the pressure, he had laid his snare so well, that the enemy was scarcely conscious of it until he

was caught and so entangled as to contemplate his chance of escape with painful apprehensions and dismal forebodings. Justly calculating, that a second battle, in case of defeat, would put the enemy in possession of Moskow, and the resources of the surrounding country ; and, in case of victory, would only drive him back without depriving him of his reinforcements, and of the power of renewing his efforts ; the Russian General chose rather to play a sure game, by sacrificing the capital, and thereby gaining an important position in the rear of Bonaparte, whose rashness and sanguine expectations, he well knew, would carry him to that city. Every thing happened as was foreseen ; and Bonaparte, from the moment of his entrance into Moskow, instead of a conqueror, beheld himself entirely at the disposal of the Russian General. He could not move but where it pleased Kutusow to lead him. His small detachments were not strong enough to relieve his necessities ; and his main army was not in condition to seek a general engagement, which was his only remedy, but which, in order to be applied, required additional reinforcements ; and these the interposing force of the Russian army, the effect of Bonaparte's own temerity and improvidence, had rendered altogether useless. Here began the disasters of the French. The moment we were apprized of Kutusow's position, a single glance convinced us that, so far from their being able to advance towards St. Petersburg, as some absurd speculations seemed to imply, their first movement would be directed southward, whether Kutusow irresistibly impelled them. Nay, we went so far as to predict, that the Ex-Conqueror could not even retreat *without fighting a great battle, or obtaining Kutusow's permission*; and we leave it to the judgment of the candid reader, whether the battle of Malojarslavitz has not verified our prediction. Independently of the Russian official account of that battle, the failure, as to object, is of itself a strong and positive confirmation. Lord Cathcart supposes that the French made the attack with a view to penetrate into the southern provinces ; we think it, however, *more probable, that necessity forced them to this measure, in order to dislodge the Russians from a position which, being nearer to Viasma, enabled them to intercept the retreat of Bonaparte to Smolensko by the main road* ; this they actually

did, and proved his defeat in proportion as he was foiled in his attempts to attain either of those objects.

“ The previous brilliant affair with Murat, unquestionably precipitated the evacuation of Moskow ; but the next reverse, second to the battle of Borodino in the scale of fatality, is the decisive victory of Witgenstein ; which, at the most critical juncture, not only deprived the main French army of every assistance from its rear, but even compelled Victor to fall back ; who, instead of endeavouring to join Bonaparte, found it necessary to support St. Cyr, and was, in conjunction with this General, finally overtaken, overthrown, and driven back upon Wilna. The victorious Witgenstein, who had so often defeated the enemy, and by maintaining his galling position on the Dwina, enabled Kutusow on one hand, and himself on the other, to command the whole line of French communication ;—this truly meritorious officer, whose name is as green as his laurels, by his last attack and ultimate success, separated Victor and St. Cyr from the main body, cleared the way for the army of Tchitchagoff, which had already advanced to join him, (and now has actually joined him) pushed towards Orsha, insured a communication with Kutusow, on the left of Smolensk, completely intercepted Bonaparte, and we doubt not will, with Tchitchagoff's co-operation, make a *third and the last stop* in the progress of the tyrant, who a few days ago we only believed *to be approaching the end of his career* ; but now our belief is turned into conviction. No vengeance was ever so speedy and terrible, no reverse was ever so great and sudden, no conqueror was ever reduced in an instant from a power so gigantic, to a condition so forlorn and miserable. The defeat of Xerxes* and Charles XII, on comparison sinks into utter insignificance, inasmuch as their means were smaller, and they fell from a lower eminence. The French army which entered Russia, amounted to 300,000 men, without including the corps of Regnier and Prince Schwartzenburg. This statement is not only supported by Alexander's proclamation, but may be actually calculated from the French Bulletins, which indeed swelled the number to 600,000, and thereby assured us at least of one half. The wreck of the main army, surrounded on all sides,

* A million upon the ancient scale is not equal in force to 100,000 men upon the modern system.

who will all perish or surrender, and other losses in Volhynia, on the Dwina, and in Courland, which are not taken into consideration ; also, the corps of Macdonald, which being composed mostly of Prussians, may be considered as gone, will increase the whole of the loss at least to 250,000 men ; so that the shattered remains under St. Cyr and Victor, should Bonaparte himself escape by a miracle and join them, is the only force that has any chance of returning ; but how precarious is even this chance ? The nearest place of apparent safety would be Königsberg. I say apparent, because the Prussians will throw off the French yoke, and receive the fugitives as open enemies. The Russians besides will be pursuing them with sword and famine ; and the frost, which is stated already at 2° below 0, colder than any day we have had here this winter, will not fail to perform its part upon the half naked, flying nurslings of the south, who would have to traverse about 250 miles from Wilna even before they could get to the firesides of their doubtful friends. If the road to Warsaw should be preferred, the distance would be much greater, and the difficulties more serious in proportion. The part of Poland allotted to Russia, is as loyal as any of the ancient possessions of that Empire, owing to the similarity of language, customs and religion. In the last campaign of 1806, the French were convinced of the truth of this assertion, and now they will feel still more sensibly that Russian Poland, as it is called, will give them no supplies ; first, because it is unwilling, secondly, because it cannot. Its northern provinces are naturally poor, and exhausted by the enemy ; while its rich and fertile provinces to the south were never out of the hands of the Russians, who barbarously have outgeneralled Bonaparte, and contrived to keep all the good things of that country for themselves. An attempt, therefore, to penetrate to Warsaw, would inevitably destroy the remainder of the French army ; the more so, as the Russians from their position could not fail of intercepting it. In short, the chances are multiplying fast, not only against any of the French runaways in a body, but against the personal escape of Bonaparte and his Generals. It would not surprize us if every individual, from the highest to the lowest, or the whole mass of 300,000 men, with the single exception of Macdonald's Prussian corps, were to find their grave, or prison, in Russia.*

* Schwartzenburg's Austrian corps had already retreated, and was safe.

“ I cannot conclude without paying a tribute due to the Russian commanders and the army. Never before was there a spectacle so august and magnificent ! On one hand, the venerable Kutusow, whom war has nursed for 75 years, like the hoary Jupiter, conceiving, directing and sending forth his thunders ; Platow, equally ancient, and the thunderbolt itself, destroying all he touches ; and Bennigsen, numbering as many years, sweeping like a whirlwind through the ranks of the enemy, whose storming undivided rage he alone had formerly sustained ; exhibit the extraordinary triumph of old age over vigorous manhood, and prove that Russia had her heroes sprung from the inspiring soul of Peter ; and that, matured under the benignant influence of Catherine II, they were consummate Generals long before the French revolution had brought forth her infant cackling brood. On the other hand, young Bagrations defeating the enemy at every encounter, and a Witgenstein successively victorious over Oudinots, St. Cyr and Victors, attest the superiority of regular education over casual exaltation ; and of theory, supported by experience, over the mere practical knowledge characterizing the greatest part of the French Generals at present. If we look lower down, we shall find admirable order and perfect discipline to pervade the whole. We have seen the Russian soldiers retreat, and we now see them advance without the least confusion or disorder ; and while the enemy has censured his chief generals, (Davoust and Sebastiani) not a murmur, not a hint of disapprobation has yet escaped the lips of the Russian commander. Not an officer of note has been reprimanded or suspended for any failure in duty or want of ability in execution. We recommend these facts to the serious consideration of all those who were, or are still inclined to question our former comments upon the superiority of the Russian Generals.”

In the same paper, on the 8th of February, in answer to certain demagogues, who still contended for Bonaparte's triumphs over the Russians, our author challenges them to solve the following problems or questions.

“ If Bonaparte was victorious in the battle of Borodino, what kept him inactive at Moskow for a whole month, in a state of starvation,

and what prevented him from procuring the necessary supplies, from seizing on the loaves and fishes carried up the Wolga, almost under his nose, and from seeking another general engagement with Kutusow, who was only a few wersts from him, and notwithstanding certain acute reasonings, was actually on the Nara, in the rear of the French army, whence, so far from being dislodged or being afraid of an attack, he himself made the first onset, of the effect of which Murat and his great brother-in-law may better inform the world ?

“ If Bonaparte made an attack on Malojarslavitz, either to penetrate to the southern provinces, or open a shorter passage to Smolensko, what drove him back upon the main road, disappointed of either of these objects ?

“ If cowardice or inability made the Russians run away, what made the French fly from Moskow ; and what is the reason, that, when the Russians retreated, order prevailed among them and insured their safety ; but when it came to the turn of the French to shew their backs, disasters on disasters followed them, thousands of horses daily perished (as is confessed in their own bulletins, which are considered infallible,) hundreds of waggons, scores of cannon were taken from them, and their reverses were so rapid as to make the author of the “ Resources of Russia ” blush for his mistake and ignorance in not having stated them higher ?

“ If St. Cyr was not beaten, why did Victor, instead of advancing to the aid of the main army, fall back to support him, and with him was driven from the Dwina, abandoning the field to Witgenstein, and Tchitchagoff, whose junction was so ominous to Bonaparte and the flower of his army ?

“ Lastly, if Bonaparte is not intercepted, surrounded and cut off, so as to make his escape a miracle, why, as it appears from the last Paris advices of Dec. 12, brought by the Post-Boy to Salem—why has there been no bulletin, or any official intelligence received up to that time at Paris ? Why are the Paris editors obliged to go to Vienna for news about their own troops in Poland ? Why even these accounts, uncertain, unofficial and desultory as they are, refer only to Prince Schwartzburg’s and Victor’s corps, the only force that is not yet hemmed in by the Russians, and hangs in broken

fragments in the rear ? If Bonaparte was at Orsha on the 15th of Nov. according to these random accounts, and near Borissow on the 27th, why should he prefer writing a private letter and not an official bulletin, the appearance of which he knew was indispensable at a moment so critical at home ? Nay, if he had escaped, why has he not appeared at Warsaw, with Victor, or at Paris, where he had time enough to arrive; no less than 38 days from the 11th November, the date of his last 28th bulletin, to the 18th of December, to which the advices were received from Paris, when the Post-Boy left Marseilles on the 24th December ? Why should Bonaparte consider his presence unnecessary at his capital, when conspiracies are forming against him, and rumours of his death are circulated and believed with such avidity, and so much to the prejudice of his most essential interests and personal safety ? We were going to ask, why Prince Schwartzenburg, who, as Paris editors say, had defeated Sacken, has not advanced an inch from his position, and for several days after the battle remained stationary ; but we deem it a degradation to reason upon such unauthorised, foolish and inconsistent accounts, and finish with a prophecy, challenging a counter prophecy, that Bonaparte never shall see St. Petersburg unless as a prisoner, and that *Prussia against the next spring, will furnish an army of 40 or 50,000 men, not to fight the Russians, but to expel and chastise the Tyrant who had enslaved her.*”

As the doubtful and anxious interval between the receipt of the 28th and 29th bulletin increased, the Author sent an article to “ the Repertory and General Advertiser,” which appeared on the 9th of February, and begins thus :—

“ Where is Bonaparte, where is the mighty man, at whose very name the world shook to its base ? This was the first question that occurred to us, and the first we wished to satisfy by perusing the late Paris accounts, brought by the Post-Boy to Salem. But all our researches were in vain, and the cloud which enveloped his fate, was only found to lour with increased darkness. We did not, *and do not believe*, the story of his assassination by his own soldiers, because the story itself comes in a very questionable shape, and because such an event could not have transpired alone, without

disclosing to our view, other circumstances relating to the movements and actual state of his army. But we *nevertheless, cannot repel the conviction of his being, at least, politically destroyed; as nothing short of his being intercepted and surrounded, could suspend the communication between him and Paris, for the space of nearly four weeks.* From June, when Bonaparte entered Russia, to the 11th of November, the date of his last Bulletin, little more than five months in all, there were issued no less than twenty-eight Bulletins, leaving thus between each an interval of about five days; it must *therefore be owing to something more serious than a mere accident, that the usual routine of these bulletins is at once cut off, and at a most critical juncture, France is deprived of regular intelligence from the army."*

At length the 29th bulletin arrived, and the "Boston Gazette" of Feb. 15, 1813, presented the public with the following remarks, where the loss of a French corps, supposed by the author to have amounted to 12,000 men, turned out to have been about 10,000 strong, which is very near the mark.

"Nothing short of cruel and absolute necessity could have extorted such mortifying confessions as the 29th Bulletin contains; such indeed as might well be suspected of being forged, had they come from any other place but France, and had they been more at variance with the Russian official accounts both as to date and matter. It appears from the intercepted documents, that the number of the French army, at the time of its departure from Moskow, was 85,000 strong, and its loss, in several battles between Moskow and Smolensk, was 38,000 men; so that when it reached the latter place, there remained only 48,000 or 50,000 men, if we include Augereau's corps and other forces which were coming fresh to open a new communication with Kalouga. Eugene's corps was dispersed on the 8th of November, since which time nothing certain has transpired concerning his fate. He is only once mentioned in the Bulletin, in such a way as to make it evident that since the time above mentioned his movements had not yet been ascertained. The destruction of his corps, and the capture of Augereau, reduced the main army to about 35,000 men, commanded by Mar-

shals Davoust and Ney, and divided into two columns, 15,000 men each ; the choice body of guards with Bonaparte, Murat, the staff, and ex-dukes or ex-generals, who lost their command by losing their troops, forming the remaining 5000. In consequence of the movements of Tchitchagoff, Bonaparte confessed that he could not keep at Smolensk, and having made this apology for not remaining 80 miles *nearer* to St. Petersburg, according to his promise, he left Smolensk on the 13th Nov. with a view of arriving, as he said, at Minsk before the enemy. As far as we can judge from the accounts on both sides, his army marched in the following order : Davoust in the advanced guard, the Emperor with his staff and guards in the centre, and Ney bringing up the rear. The indefatigable veteran Kutusoff, sent General Miloradovitz to intercept them, and this truly meritorious officer, who first met Davoust, succeeded in completely defeating him on the 16th of November. Bonaparte, who was present in person, fled with precipitation, and abandoned this corps to the Russians. On the 17th the rear guard, under Ney, was stopped near the same place, and towards the 18th it was completely defeated, destroyed or taken. In these two actions, upwards of 20,000 prisoners taken, and a third at least killed, give us the whole force of Davoust and Ney, and finish the grand army that was at Moskow.

“ How many of the remaining 5000 escaped with Bonaparte, time alone will inform us ; but it is plain that they fell in with Oudinot's and Victor's corps, and that these were the only two engaged in the most important battle of Borissow, which, we are certain, *has consummated the unprecedented disasters of the French*. Bonaparte acknowledged that his object was to get to Minsk, and thence either to Warsaw or to Wilna by the main road ; and yet we find that in consequence of this battle he was compelled to abandon the main road, and fly across the country full of marshes, lakes and woods almost impassable. He is so conscious of this, that he labours to convince the world, that the road he took, where there was no road at all, was better than the road he left, which was the only road ; and that marshes, lakes, woods, and other disagreeable obstacles, were all at once transferred from the wilderness he was passing, to the populous parts from which he was receding ! ! ! As to his

taking 500 waggons, and twice 6000 prisoners, when he could not carry his own waggons or feed his own men, it is too ridiculous a bombast to be noticed, and being the only opening for a good tough story, he filled it without mercy. We shall not however envy him so poor a consolation ; nor shall we inquire why, if he defeated Tchitchagoff on the Berezina, " all the passes were still in the hands of the Russians." Though the battle, where his cuirassiers performed such wonders, took place on the 28th of Nov. he had so little *leisure on the road of his choice*, that until the 3d of Dec. he could not, or perhaps forgot to issue the said bulletin, containing his dying speech and confession. Surely there never was a reverse so great, a vengeance so awful !

" Nor is there any prospect of relief at *Wilna any more than at Smolensk*. Bonaparte will still be pursued even into the heart of Prussia without any hope of causing the Russians to "pause." He talks of replacing his artillery, recruiting his army ; how and by what means ? He talks of 20,000 horses being in different depots ; where are the depots ? If in Poland, Poland is in the hands of the Russians, and so will be the horses. The Paris papers, which " lie worse than a bulletin," announce 120,000 men ready to march to Bonaparte's assistance : where are they ? From Warsaw, where Prince Schwartzenburg remains with his Austrians, *not very willing to serve Bonaparte*, to the extremity of Courland, where Macdonald is stationed with his Prussians, *still less willing to assist the Tyrant* who had enslaved them, there is no force of any importance that can for a single moment *check the course of the victorious Russians*. Witgenstein and Tchitchagoff in their rapid advance will not even *experience the want of provisions* ; as Kutusow, *being in the rear with his main army, supplied from the adjacent countries, will not fail to support and facilitate their movements.*"

About this time was published the second edition of the "Resources of Russia," to which the author added " a sketch of the present campaign," whose facts and reasonings or comments, though he had to grope his way in the dark, for want of positive or

regular official intelligence, have been confirmed in detail by Kerr Porter's account of the same campaign—a man who was an eye-witness to the principal transactions of that glorious period. We shall present here the author's statements with regard to the battle of Borodino ; chiefly because he *particularly* and uniformly seems to have considered that battle as the original cause and source of Bonaparte's disasters ; because, until the above ample confirmation by Porter, of all the writers who touched on this subject in America, he stood alone, as to the latitude of this opinion, if we except the eloquent Mr. Harper, who soon after followed him ; because some writers, who publicly questioned his declaration, in the same sketch, of the innocence of Speransky, (confirmed since beyond all doubt by Speransky's well known safety, subsequent to the supposed conspiracy,* the reports of which have suddenly died away) widely differed from him on the issue of that famous battle ; and because the imaginary speech which he put into the mouth of Kutusow, is now a real and historical exposition of the policy of that great general. The extract begins thus at the page 118 :—

“ The battle commenced on the 4th of Sept. and lasted, with various success till the 7th, when it assumed its final and horrible aspect, turning the actions of the three preceding days into mere skirmishes, or sportive trials of strength. Since the introduction of modern tactics, there has never been a battle like this, as to the prodigious extent of forces engaged on both sides, the skill of the respective commanders and officers, the bravery and discipline of the troops, and the horrid slaughter of men, falling like a ripened harvest beneath the sweeping hurricane. Each moment a thousand mouths, as the 18th bulletin says, scattered death on all sides, and with torrents of human blood deluged the earth. In short, the horrors of this sanguinary day, surpassed the horrors of the 8th of February 1806, as much as this last (the battle of Eylau) surpassed, in destruction, all the intermediate and the preceding battles recorded in the annals of the civilized world. There is only this resemblance in them, that the Russians in both fought against

* This conspiracy turns out in fact to have been a plot against Speransky himself and some of his friends, intended to ruin them in the Emperor's opinion.

superior numbers, and in both remained masters of the field, though the armies, on each side, were so disabled as to undertake nothing of consequence for some time after. The essential advantages, however, of the battle of Borodino, were evidently on the side of the Russians ; and a few facts will convince every impartial reader of the truth of this assertion.

“ The Russian accounts, which by their modest and temperate tone, when contrasted with the inflated strain of the French bulletins, created at first despondence, but now are entitled to additional confidence, expressly announced that Bonaparte was driven back about 3 o'clock at noon, and that the battle was won by the Russians, who, according to subsequent reports, remained for two days on the field, removing the wounded, and burying the dead, and only quitted it after a deliberate consultation ; in other words, in compliance with their original system. The French 18th bulletin, in describing this battle, evidently accords with the Russian accounts, if not in terms, at least in matter implied. It acknowledges the action was over, early in the afternoon, suppressing merely, that, though it was over with the French, it was not so with the Russians, whose fire had not ceased till night. But the date of the bulletin is conclusive, being on the third day after the battle ; that is, as soon as the Russians, at the expiration of two days claimed by them, had retired, and gave the French an opportunity of dating their bulletin on the field of battle. It is well known that the French, as well as other generals, if victorious, always date their despatches immediately after a battle ; and accordingly the Russian general issued his own the next morning, on the 8th of September, while Bonaparte deferred his till the 10th, a circumstance which no sophistry can reconcile with his pretensions to victory. So desirous was he to repel the suspicion of having failed, that not being able to state the subsequent positions of the Russian army, as is generally expected from a victor, and warranted by Bonapart's former practice, he employed a Polish renegado in reconnoitring the *fugitives* ; and for the first time was obliged to substitute the supposed information, given by Russian sarjeants and recruits, for that which, if he had conquered, he had completely in his power to furnish in a manner much more entitled to credit. Indeed, sometime or other it will appear in history, that the mere

desire of concealing his defeat, induced him, contrary to the advice of his best generals, to advance at all hazards ; and approach that gulf of destruction, which he otherwise would probably have avoided.

“ Thus far the honour of the day remained with the Russians ; and their victory could not be denied by any of those, with whom the mere keeping of the field is the best criterion of success ; but there are many, who, with more propriety, judge of the success by the consequences, and who will naturally ask, why did Kutusow retire, if he were successful, and give up Moskow to destruction ? The answer is, that Napoleon’s advancing was a proof, not of his victory, but of rashness, the fatal effects of which he soon experienced ; and that Kutusow’s retreat was the result of wisdom, which suspended, for a moment, his triumph, but soon more firmly established it, and in more striking colours displayed it to the world. As to the destruction of Moskow, there are facts enough to justify us in making the Russian general speak for himself, and thus he must have reasoned :—

“ I know, that the enemy cannot easily recover from the severe blow I have inflicted on him ; but I am also sensible, that, in the struggle, I have myself been much weakened. I have done enough for the honour of my country, and for my own reputation ; and it is time to think of means, sure, yet the least expensive, to finish the work, which cost so much in the beginning, but whose progress is now rendered less difficult. If I resolve on another battle, I must sacrifice a great many brave men, and my utmost success can only be, to drive the enemy back upon his reinforcements, which may sustain him, and enable him to renew his efforts ; but if I retard the hour of decision, until his festering wounds spread a mortal languor over his whole body, I shall ensure success, and save my soldiers, whose lives are of more importance to the country, than the destruction of the capital—the mere destruction of a certain kind of property—all measures having already been taken to remove the inhabitants, with their personal effects. It is true, that the preserving of the city might not materially impede the final issue, on which I calculate with confidence ; but, as it is intended to starve the enemy in his new quarters, by destroying these, I wish only to preserve the lives of the citizens, who otherwise may probably remain there, and share the fate of their invaders. Be-

sides, the nobility, the merchants, and other classes, being willing to make this sacrifice, I shall choose the least of evils, by allowing the enemy to enter Moskow, whither, I doubt not, his rashness will lead him. but where he will give me an opportunity of encompassing, more effectually, his ruin.'

"The council of war sanctioned this resolution, and the Russian general, like a skilful hunter, who had mortally wounded a fierce animal, stepped aside to wait merely till his ferocious prey should be ensnared by its own rage, and exhausted by its fruitless exertions, so as to be destroyed, in the end, with more facility and less sacrifice. Every thing was accordingly foreseen ; every necessary measure adopted ; all calculations made with wonderful accuracy ; and all expectations were crowned with perfect success.

"The flames, which illuminated Bonaparte's entrance into Moskow, on the 14th of Sept. enlightened him, for the first time, on the reality of his perilous situation, and on the Russian national character ; which he had so far misconceived, as to flatter himself, that, from its supposed instability, from the fancied disaffection of the nobles, and the presumed weakness in the government, Russia, overcome by the spirit of intrigue, and ensnared in his artful negotiations, would not hesitate to commit at length the monstrous crime of suicide. It was in the smoking ruin of the ancient city of the czars, that he beheld a funeral pyre, on which were consumed all his hopes of dividing the Russian people, and either of alluring the peasantry with the glittering toys of French liberty, or of intimidating their emperor with the glare of the Parisian sword. It was there that all his imaginary projects of fresh triumphs, and of new conquests, in an instant vanished ; and the dark September-night, brooding over the vast conflagration, as if to conceal it from the eye of vengeful heaven, was but a faint image of the tyrant's frowns, and that outward gloom, beneath which raged the various contending passions of his soul :—

Page 148, the author concludes the sketch in the following prophetic manner.

"It seems, as if the magnitude of object, and the immensity of preparation, were only designed to make failure and destruction proportionably extensive. No phenomenon was ever so porten-

tous in the beginning, and so auspicious in its termination. Its first appearance was that of a baleful comet, or the huge eclipse, shedding "disastrous light" on the affrighted world ; but its exit *left a mild and unexpected radiance behind, which rejoices, and will continue to rejoice, the now respiring nations.* No spectacle, at first so dismal and terrible, was more magnificent in its progress, and none was ever more brilliantly closed. The very ground which, five months since, had trembled beneath the daring and lawless foot of the boasting, insulting, and remorseless invader, now reposes beneath the *congenial and well known tread of its legitimate owners.* Poland too receives the Russian armies, and again sees their standards wave on her ramparts ; *but she expects peace and happiness, and fears not to be deceived.* Instructed by the painful experience of the past, she returns to the bosom of *her natural protector, with whom by custom, religion, language, and the same origin, she is closely and inseparably united.** Kutusow, who entered Wilna on the 12th, forms the prominent character in this last and truly sublime scene. He seems the centre of motion, and the soul of action, while all around him is rapidity, order, harmony, and activity ; a combination of skill, discipline, and zeal, which makes each agent, in his particular sphere, equally great, and which renders any comparison, or discrimination of merit, impossible. All have done their duty ; all have deserved well of their country ; all have commanded the world's admiration ; and all, through the various changes of time, with joy and gratitude will be remembered by posterity.

" Thus ends the most eventful tragedy that ever was performed on the world's stage ; a tragedy, where nations were spectators, where upwards of 700,000 men appeared as actors, where reality surpassed the poet's faithful imagination, and where the invisible hand, which directed all, had disposed time, plot, and incidents according to the established, and most approved rules of the drama. The previous correspondence, and the proclamation immediately preceding, form the prologue to the bloody business. From the middle of June, to the middle of August, the various movements

* It is a well known fact, that the Russian government always has been the most popular in Poland.

and manœuvres, on both sides, make up the first act, and lay the foundation of the plot. From the 18th of August, beginning with the battle of Smolensko, to the 6th of September, is a second act ; where the plot is rising, and beginning slowly to develop itself. The third act commences with the horrid battle of Borodino, on the 7th of September ; and, though the change of fortune has actually taken place, hopes and fears are so artfully balanced, that the interest increases, and expectation becomes more and more excited. The fourth act begins with Murat's defeat on the 18th of October, and the consequent evacuation of Moskow. Here, the great reverse assumes a decisive character ; the plot is ripened into explosion ; the causes, leading to the main catastrophe, are boldly and openly brought into action ; incidents thicken on incidents ; events follow each other in rapid and brilliant succession ; and the act concludes with Bonaparte's entrance into Smolensko, on the 9th of November. The audience are now impatient for the fifth act ; and at length it appears with the retreat from Smolensko, and the destruction of Davoust and Ney's corps, between the 17th and 18th of November. This is, as it ought to be, by far the busiest act. It impels the spectators along, and, gathering strength in its accelerated progress, it hurries them from scene to scene, until they reach the final catastrophe, scarcely sensible of the distance they have traversed. Here they pause, and here the hero of the piece delivers his last speech and confession, (29th bulletin) *retires to die (politically) behind the scenes, and leaves the subordinate actors to shift for themselves ; who, one by one, quit the stage, and go where they can, stripped of their false ornaments, divested of their scenic grandeur, and restored to their native and original obscurity."*

It is remarkable that the author's calculation of the whole probable French loss, in killed and wounded, not including officers, made from no particular data, but apparently at hazard, on comparison with the official return published at St. Petersburg and not received here till some months after the sketch was printed, varies only in a few figures, as may be seen from the following.

According to our author the French loss was,

In killed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	186,000
Wounded	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	166,000
Total									352,000

According to the official return,

In killed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135,635
Wounded	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	210,530
Total									346,165

The probable number of the fugitives who escaped beyond the Vistula is yet more remarkable for its correctness ; for while our author supposes it to be more or less - - - - - 18,000

The above official return, after deducting the Prussian and Austrian corps in the manner of our author, states the number positively at - - - - - 15,000

The author next proceeds to speculate with his usual boldness on the future state of Europe, or the future conduct of the European powers, in consequence of the Russian successes. This was risking at once his whole reputation for foresight and judgment ; but this confidence in himself, again most triumphantly justified by the events, shows that his knowledge of European affairs in general, a point which he probably wished to establish, was no less accurate than that of the Russian affairs in particular. He thus begins with Russia, page 157 :—

“ The policy of Alexander is open and manly, soaring above mean intrigue, and low subterfuge. He honestly declared to the world, that the restoration of the Prussian monarchy to its independence and integrity was essential to his interests, as it would form a bar of separation between his and the French empire. He also made it known through Kutusow, that no peace can, or shall be made, until the French have repassed the Vistula. Therefore, when it is considered, that this comes from an emperor, who has just redeemed the pledge, given to his people, of “ never sheathing his sword, as long as a single enemy remained on his territo-

ries ;” it cannot be doubted, but he *will pursue the enemy beyond the Vistula,—to Berlin,—and further, if necessary ;—to rescue, in the first instance, the king and kingdom of Prussia from thralldom, and thus inflict a noble vengeance on the shade of Frederick the Great, whose jealousies and hatred of the Russian nation, and whose unworthy conduct towards the founder of the Russian empire,* are an indelible stain on his own memory.*

“ The well-known disposition of Alexander, whose ambition is, *to be the pacificator, and not the conqueror of the world ; his extreme reluctance to shed human blood, even in cases of necessity ; and the vast expenses and sacrifices attending a foreign war, might induce us to believe, that he would not in any event advance beyond the Elbe : but, on the other hand, his wisdom, and the dearest interests of his country, will not permit him to throw away the advantages he has acquired ; to allow the enemy to recover breath ; and be, at the end, compelled to go through the same process, in order to re-purchase the same advantages. Delay, being favourable to the enemy, is of course prejudicial to himself ; and, in the present circumstances, would be a grievous fault, almost irreparable. It is probable, therefore, that the Russian emperor will pursue the war, until the Rhenish confederacy is broken, the duke of Oldenburg restored to his dominions, Holland rescued from her bondage, all the ports in the north of Europe are opened to commerce, and an honourable, general peace is obtained and established on a permanent basis.*

“ The Rhenish confederates, who groan under French oppression, are mostly related to the emperor. The dukes of Weimar, Baden, Mecklenburg and others, connected with him by family ties, which nothing but the predominant power of France could break for a moment, *all entertain strong hopes and expectations of being delivered by him ; and he will not abandon them, when Providence has now bestowed on him the enviable power to save ; and when not to save, would shew his unconsciousness of his great destiny. He will protect them for the same reason, that he protects the king of Prussia and the duke of Oldenburg, who are likewise his relations.*

“ As to his views of conquest, they do not *extend beyond Poland.* It would, however, be a just reward for his exertions, and a beneficial exchange to the inhabitants themselves, to leave him in pos-

* Peter the great.

session of the country, as far as the Vistula, and of the Austrian part of Poland. He might then *proclaim himself king of Poland, unite and consolidate the people, and gratify their pride by shewing to the world, that, as a nation, they are still in existence.* It is of the partition of their country among the different powers,—separating, as it were, brother from brother, and father from son,—and not of dependence upon any one in particular, that they have chiefly complained. It is also certain, that, if they were left to their own choice, they would unanimously prefer the protection of Russia, because she is more able to defend them ; and because her government, wisely and mildly administered, was rendered still more popular by local prejudices, in her favour ; prejudices, which arise, as was already mentioned, from the similarity of language, customs, and other circumstances. *Prussia, for the loss of her part, might be easily indemnified in Saxony, whose king, if we except the elector of Bavaria, is the most attached to France, and therefore may justly be treated like an enemy. Austria also, would think herself amply paid, for the loss of her share, by the recovery of her German and Italian states, which she can easily do with the assistance of Russia."*

Of Prussia he speaks thus, page 163 :—

"PRUSSIA will unquestionably join Russia, both from good will, and from the force of circumstances. From France she experienced nothing but disgrace and oppression ; from Russia, she has known nothing but kindness and friendship, and now from her alone she can expect safety, protection, and the restoration of her lost independence. She cannot hesitate for a moment between a deadly foe, who has thirsted for her ruin, and a faithful friend, who has shed his blood in her defence. The Prussians hold the French in abhorrence ; they do not think themselves fairly conquered ; and pant for an opportunity of vindicating that military character, for which they were so celebrated in Frederick's time, and the supposed loss of which is most galling to their pride—a source of constant humiliation, to remove which they would spare neither blood nor treasure.

"They are not, besides, corrupted by French influence, like their German brethren ; and still have virtue, talent, and patriotism enough to deliver their country from ignominious bondage.

They want but an impulse, and Russia is destined to give it. D'Yorke's convention with the Russian general, is a certain pledge of their hearty co-operation in their own cause, and it is not in the power of Bonaparte to check them. If he restores their king, the presence of their sovereign, whose present language is only the language of restraint, not of the heart, will animate them to greater exertion ; but if the tyrant should remove him, they will be the more incensed, and stimulated to revenge. Be it as it may, they will receive the Russians as friends and brothers, and will open to them their towns, their houses, and their arms, with most cordial welcome."

On the subject of Austria, to whom our author is not very partial, he speaks with great doubt, despondence, and reproach. It must be confessed that his suspicions of her have not been wholly unfounded ; and it is evident, that, though she joined the allies, a certain reluctance and hesitation were discernible in her conduct, throughout the whole campaign terminated in the capture of Paris. After the battle of Dresden, according even to Lord Cathcart's despatches, she appears to have wavered, and nothing but Alexander's presence, and his bringing extra force into action, could have prevailed on her to go on. During the invasion of France, she again showed symptoms of discontent, as appeared from a ministerial message to the British Parliament, where the expression " The allies are *now* unanimous," must have exclusively applied to her, as she alone could have wished to preserve Bonaparte, for the sake of his son ; nevertheless our author had still some hopes of her, as may be perceived from the following passage, page 166 :—

" If Austria therefore takes the part of France, her Polish possessions will be lost without an equivalent : but if she thinks, that her arms furnish better means to repossess herself of the Italian states, and extend her power to the Mediterranean,—an object of great interest to her,—*she will join Russia, and be, for once, on the right side of the question. This is certainly the course of wisdom ; for with Russia she can be what she was, and with France she will be less than she is."*

Of Sweden the author speaks thus, page 175 :—

“ IF SWEDEN, however, wishes to recover Pomerania, *she must, of necessity, act with Russia and England* : indeed, from her geographical situation, *she has no other choice than to be the ally of both, and no other chance of prosperity.*”

He then proceeds to the rest :—

“ DENMARK, whether she wishes, or not, *must follow in the train of the northern powers* ; *she will however wait, as long as she can, to see which side is likely to prevail in Germany.* She has been a mere tool, a miniature of France, and the satellite of Bonaparte, whose acts of plunder and piracy she has been aping to the utmost of her insignificant power. It is of very little consequence which way she goes, provided she does not continue privateering against the commercial property in the Baltic ; for then she will find, *to her cost, that her power of doing mischief is of short duration ; and that Holstein and Norway, perchance, may be disposed of, not exactly to her liking.*

“ THE RHENISH CONFEDERATION, or princes composing it,—though they are tired of being less than the prefects of Bonaparte, —though they hail with joy their prospect of deliverance, and are inclined, from family connexions as well as other motives, to favour the Russian interest,—*are so weak, that they will not dare to stir, until the French shall have left them, or the Prussians, if not Russians, shall have entered their territories. Then they certainly will. The fallen tyrant of Europe, as he recedes towards France, will multiply his enemies ; and Russia will find new friends, as she advances from her own territories.*

“ TURKEY, by her recent conduct, has most unequivocally shewn her preference of Russian to French alliance ; and was the only power, that did not desert Russia. As there is no doubt but her adherence to the Russian cause proceeded from an anticipation of its success ; such adherence must be now strengthened by the fears of provoking the prodigiously augmented power of Russia ; and by a desire of conciliating her emperor, who knows how to estimate and remember good offices. The Turkish divan are perfectly acquainted with the character of Alexander ; and are aware, that to be upon friendly terms with him is their best security ; and that, as long as they do not compel him to measures of

hostility, he will not injure them. For these reasons, *Turkey certainly will be on the side of Russia* ; and, as was before observed, will take the field, and is actually engaged, by treaty, to take it against Austria, the moment the latter should make a serious demonstration against Russia. If Austria, contrary to all expectation, should join France, the whole of Europe will be in flames, and divided into two parties ; that is, France and Austria, on one side, will have to contend with Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and perhaps Sweden on the other ; *Austria, however, with all her imprudence, is not likely to take such a step.*

“ OF GREAT-BRITAIN very little can be said ; her policy and conduct being less subject to change and speculation. She is the natural ally of Russia, and profits, more than any other power, by the Russian successes. *All her channels of European commerce will be restored ; and her prosperity, from the intercourse with the continent, will be revived with greater vigour than ever*, as the tyranny of the French, and the desolation caused by their wars and decrees, have annihilated continental manufactures, and therefore prodigiously increased the demand upon England. The groundwork of the restrictive system, operating against her, *will be entirely destroyed* ; and it will be completely *in her power, by using her advantages with wisdom and moderation.*—by adding to her own naval power the influence or mediation of Russia,—*to turn her enemies to friends, or to entail on them exclusively all the losses and calamities of war.*

“ THE LAST QUESTION, *how far France will be able to check the progress of the Russians ?* it would take a volume to answer. Suffice it therefore to observe, that France is not in a condition to exert herself with her former success. The incessant and ruinous wars, in which she has been for a series of years involved ; the enormous and wanton waste of blood and treasure ; the total stagnation of commerce, and the consequent reduction of her national resources, at the moment when her necessities have increased in double proportion ; have so embarrassed her finances, and exhausted her effective population, as to render her efforts comparatively feeble, and unavailing. *This is no dream, no rash, vain, and extravagant anticipation ; but an absolute fact, which the first trial will establish beyond all possibility of doubting. It will soon be seen, that*

she is not half so able now to defend herself. even at home, as she was ten years ago. It will be seen, that her brilliant career, rich in unsubstantial triumphs, but poor in solid advantages, was undermining her vital strength, and propelling her back to relative impotence. It will be seen, that, by persecuting commerce, she has punished herself much more, than her tributary nations—ininitely more than England—and has inflicted a fatal blow on her own prosperity. The system of exaggeration, for many years successfully pursued by her—which overawed the weak and timid, checked the strong and daring, and imposed upon the world at large—cannot last for ever ; and the illusion it created *will soon be broken*, when her *real strength will appear much below its general estimate.* There was an artificial splendour thrown around her, which bedazzled the mind, and diverted it from contemplating the substance itself. She appeared like some object looming at sea, and diminishing in size as it is approached ; or, to speak more pointedly, she was in the state of the human body, diseased with dropsy, where the enlargement of external parts was mistaken for a symptom of health and vigour.

“ Her conscriptive system, the parent of fallacious theories,† which, even in the eyes of distinguished men, men whose talents and labours are an honour to their country, gave her a magic superiority over all the rest, was only the effect of unnatural irritation ; producing an extraordinary exertion, which must inevitably be followed by correspondent lassitude and weakness. It was the speed of a race-horse, galled by the spur, or excited by ambition, beating all the rest upon a short distance, but finally giving way to a common well-conditioned animal, proceeding with his regular pace. A vast body of water can only be kept together by an equilibrium, or by its outlet being proportionate to its inlet ; but if, by the breaking down of the bank, or any other cause creating an unusual impulse, its regular channel of egress should swell into an overwhelming torrent, the streams, which feed the main body, cannot supply the deficiency quick enough, and the whole must be,

† It is singular, that those, who, upon such theories, supported the *irreversibility* of France, had entirely overlooked that in Prussia the same system was rigorously and habitually enforced ; and yet no other power, that pretended to military distinction, was ever so easily and rapidly overthrown.

sooner or later exhausted. So it is with the French conscription, which becomes less and less productive every year. In ordinary times it has only been sufficient to repair the annual losses of the army ; and in the late terrible, though, in appearance, most prosperous wars, it could only supply the deficiency by anticipation. How impoverished then, and how inadequate must be this source, after such a campaign, as the last ; a campaign, which must accelerate the issue of the previous concurrent and debilitating causes ; terminate the feverish energy, imparted by the revolution ; throw France back, weak and exhausted after the paroxysm, into her natural state ; and to produce that consummation of disasters, which she was for some time approaching, but which was hid from the inattentive spectator, by the imposing splendour of her triumphs.

“ The *consummation of disasters* is not meant here to imply the downfall and total dissolution of France ; but that critical state, in which, her wings being clipped, and her claws drawn out, the whole body is so enfeebled, that years of peace and rest can only restore her, and one violent attack more would be fatal to her existence. The nation, which could bear so much reduction, must still be strong, like a man of robust constitution, who may even in his illness overcome a healthy adversary of weaker frame ; nevertheless, her power of conquest is destroyed, and her ability to defend herself is so far impaired, as to render *her safety doubtful, and the capture of Paris by the Russians much more probable, than the marching of the French to St. Petersburg.* For it cannot be doubted, but the Russians, in case France persists in rejecting all terms of accommodation, will pursue her broken legions, even to her capital—to the very heart of her own empire. If they do so, and they must, unless peace prevents them ; they must conquer in spite of all predictions to the contrary, as the chances are reversed, and doubled in their favour. France, in 1799, was much stronger than she is now, and her armies were entire ; and yet the Russians, who invaded her at that time, were prevented from marching to Paris, merely by a disagreement between Paul and the Austrian cabinet. Her resistance, therefore, would be feeble indeed, when, besides the invading force being ten times greater, her own resources are diminished, and her armies swept from the face of the earth.

“ France cannot recover her loss in Poland. It is not merely the men, who composed her army, that she has lost ; but all the physical and moral means, indispensable for its support, were also destroyed. It was a nation sunk at once. It was embarking the capital and the interest in a hazardous voyage, on which no insurance was made, but all was trusted to the superior strength of the vessel ; and then losing both by a sudden wreck, from which neither planks enough to build a boat, nor men enough to navigate it, could be saved. The ruined merchant, however, has in this case, so far the advantage, that, if his credit be good at home, he may get assistance, embark in some new enterprize, and by one lucky turn, recover all ; whereas France, whose finances are too embarrassed to relieve her poverty, has no credit whatever. Who will trust her ? Of whom will she borrow, when her own merchants are ruined, and when strangers, whom she affects to consider as friends, no longer dread her power, which had already extorted from them the greatest part of their property ? Will the runaway dukes and marshals open their private purses, and will Napoleon, or his rapacious ex-empress Josephine, empty the treasures out of their private coffers ? They may do so, rather than be driven from their “ bad eminence ;” but the resource is precarious, insufficient, and at best, of a transient nature. Unless, therefore, Bonaparte has the magic power to make war without money, call up his dead warriors from their graves in Poland, or create new ones, by sowing the dragon’s teeth upon the field ; he can as easily stop the motion of the earth, as check the progress of the Russians, or, by preserving his allies, preserve his own power.

“ That he will endeavour to make a show of force in hopes of keeping his allies in awe, is most certain ; but that he will dare to meet the Russians half way, or that he can expect to frighten them from their purpose, whatever it may be, is extremely improbable. What force can he now bring against them into the field, with any prospect of success ? Of the whole French army, never materially exceeding 400,000 men, 250,000 (the stated proportion of Frenchmen) sacrificed in Poland, 100,000 toiling in Spain, and about 50,000 dispersed in various parts of Germany and Italy, to keep the faithful allies in obedience, make up the whole number, and leave scarcely the semblance of a regular army in the interior

of France. The Spanish war, which was undermining his resources, even before he went to Russia, by being a constant and heavy expense to him, without any plunder in return, to enable him, as was the case in other places, to rivet the chains of slavery by the hands of the victims themselves ; must *still employ his famishing troops there, and he dares not, at least, will not, recal them, until he is driven to the last extremity of confessing to the world the real incompetency of his means at home. He knows too well, that by such a step, he would invite lord Wellington's attack upon some vital parts of France ; and therefore thinks it best to defend himself in Spain ; cunningly turning the measure of necessity into an appearance of defiance and triumph. The recal of troops from that country would be the most conclusive, and the greatest proof imaginable*, of his despair, and of his want of confidence in his 350,000 conscripts and militia men, so exultingly announced in all the papers. 350,000 men, and no more, when a great "display of force" is so indispensable—and when, according to the constant practice of exaggeration in prosperous times, and with less motive, the whole must have been estimated, at least, one half above its real number—is a pitiful force, and a terrible falling off from the 800,000 men, which had so often appeared on paper, and made the world tremble. But let him have it all as he states it ; let it be supposed probable, that a man, who never told truth when falsehood was altogether unprofitable, should tell truth now, when falsehood is so essential to his interest ; and what then ? Is his militia, pompously called "cohorts," and intended only for home defence, but now forced to make *an offer* of their services for other purposes, any proof of his being well provided with regular troops, or of his being able and willing to march against the Russians far beyond his own frontiers ? Or are his conscripts, forming the remainder, mere boys and raw recruits, the specimen of the immense effective force still left him ? Can these, with their looks, appal the victorious veterans ? Will he dare to meet, can he hope to overcome the Russian warriors, who have destroyed his best troops, with these beardless striplings ; who, unless prevented by the bayonet behind, will run away at the sight of a Cozak ? No. He must first raise them, then drill them, and ask the Russians not to kill the poor creatures, until they are grown in size and discipline.

“TO RAISE THEM in numbers sufficient to fill up the dreadful chasm, made by the last campaign, is impracticable, on account of the previous great scarcity of young men, caused by the merciless scythe of war and conscription. But, supposing it to be practicable, the measure itself is a very hazardous experiment, being peculiarly oppressive at this moment. The loss of 250,000 men, in so short a time, must have made mourners of many parents ; and yet, while their hearts are bleeding with the wounds just inflicted, they are called upon to deliver up their remaining sons to the same untimely and horrible fate. It is not in human nature to bear such misery with patience ; and there is no sacrifice, no self-devotion of which a parent is not capable, in defence of his offspring. The young men too must enter the service with prospects and emotions very different from those, which heretofore were wont to animate them. Their confidence in their chief is now destroyed ; and the magic spell of his name, which decoyed them to the jaws of death, while it petrified their enemies, is now dissolved forever. He has been so completely disgraced, compelled to so infamous a flight—for there was nothing in his retrograde progress deserving the name of retreat—that of his former military reputation he has not saved enough to assure the soldier, that, in case of adverse fortune, the talents of his general would, at least, save his honour. A loss of name like this, is the most grievous and fatal, that can happen to any commander. The imagination of the young conscript, under such an impression, no longer soars like an eagle, over the ocean of futurity ; but, like a timorous dove, hastily turns away, and scarcely dares to cast a single look behind. His terror and despondency are in proportion to that youthful ardour, that fearless ignorance, and those buoyant hopes, which were formerly his conductors to the field of battle. He is now fully informed of the danger that awaits him, and views it in its real frightful aspect ; for there is no protecting and kindly deceiving phantom to step between, and cover it with its gorgeous veil. Instead of the wide and tempting road, bestrewed with laurel leaves, and leading through the golden regions of glory ; he sees a rugged path, overgrown with prickly thorns, conducting from one precipice to another, and lost amidst the graves, from which the spectres of his brethren and countrymen rise up to warn him

of his doom. Against the enemy, of whom he cannot now even think without trembling, he expects no success ; but if he should conquer, a still greater misery awaits him on the snowy plains of Poland. With such prepossessions, therefore, as these, conscripts will not be of much service to Bonaparte.

“ The exalted idea, however, that many have not ceased to entertain of the personal abilities of Bonaparte, excites apprehension, that he still will be able to repair his disasters, and even to act with vigour on the offensive. Some have gone so far, as to deem his personal escape sufficient to counterbalance the loss of his whole army ; and some, advancing still further, have declared, that of the two alternatives, the safety of his army was less dangerous to the world, than the safety of his own person. To all these a very short answer can be given.

“ Bonaparte is a mortal, and therefore cannot do that, which omnipotence alone can effect....repair the unexampled disasters, that, with one fell sweep, made his myriads disappear, and his power vanish.

“ As to his personal safety, *the ensuing spring will convince the world, that it owes its importance more to imagination, than reality.* It was France, that made him formidable. To break her power, to paralyze its systematic exertion, as has been done, is not only to reduce him to *a mere harmless man*, but to prevent her and her future rulers, from being equally formidable. The will and means of oppression were not created by him, but always existed in France, and formed a part of her political system ; these may have been directed by him with greater energy, but undoubtedly would pass the same to his successors. It is therefore of more consequence to rifle the nest, where young vultures are nursed, than to kill their guardian, who may be succeeded by another ; or to destroy the contents of the modern engine of death, than to extinguish the match, which may be relighted, and applied by another hand. *The escape of Bonaparte was even necessary to complete the triumph obtained over himself and France.* Had he fallen on the field, or been taken prisoner, the disasters of the French would have been altogether attributed to his absence ; and the idea, that he could have averted them, would prevent the world from appreciating the powerful efforts of Russia ; nay, it would have blinded all French-

men to the reality and extent of their misfortunes ; so that, under the standard of another, they still would enlist with unabated confidence ; and France might still inspire that terror, of which she is now deprived. *It is only by shewing, that France, with Bonaparte himself for her ruler, can no longer maintain her ground of elevation, that mankind in general will be convinced of the full extent of what has been done by Russia ; and they, at no distant period, will be convinced.* Bonaparte may say, that his disasters were owing to the elements ; but, had he been victorious in the preceding battles, the elements would have acted rather for, than against him ; and the battles of Borodino and the Nara could not have compelled him to remain inactive, and then to retreat at a very unfavourable season. Even when he was retracing his steps, the elements were no more inimical to him, than to his pursuers ; therefore, the excuse will not pass. *The whole truth is, that he has been beaten in every encounter, each time with greater loss ;* and the result is, that he is ruined."*

* In proof of this we subjoin the author's own note to the official tables afterwards published by him, with the translation of the Russian Pamphlet concerning the French losses :—

“The attentive inspection of the preceding tables, founded altogether upon official documents, enables us to judge not only of the precise loss by other causes besides the sword, but of the uniform skill, persevering courage, and striking activity of the Russian officers and soldiers. It brings us every where upon the visible traces of that superior and all-combining mind which directed the whole ; and of which the injustice of some foreigners, levelled more or less against every thing Russian, has attempted to rob the venerable Kutusow. It also furnishes a complete refutation to the assertions of the same systematic revilers, that Napoleon's defeat was caused by the “frightful climate” of Russia ; for, independently of the testimony of the French bulletins themselves, which announce “fine weather,” as late as the beginning of November, preceded by the complete rout and disasters of the French, it is now clear, that, even before their retreat from Moskow, they had already lost 61,620 killed ; 6 generals, 865 officers, and 41,016 rank and file, prisoners ; 10 standards ; 103 pieces of cannon ; and 415 caissons or ammunition waggons : a loss which the apologists of Napoleon will find extremely difficult to reconcile with his pretensions to victory, or with their own support of those pretensions upon the alleged influence of the climate.”

About this time also the memorable Russian festival took place in Boston, to which various poetical effusions were contributed, and published in a pamphlet called "Sketch of the church Solemnities at the Stone Chapel." Among these contributions is our Author's hymn, which we extract entire, marking as usual the prophetic stanzas, which evidently goes farther than the events of the Russian Campaign.

" Moving with Tempest's rapid pace,

By mad ambition fir'd,

And best success inspir'd ;

Th' oppressor of the human race

With strength that never fail'd,

The world's great hope assail'd.

But him by rage impell'd

Th' Omnipotent beheld ;

And thus from heaven's dread height,

Denounc'd his boastful might.

RECIT. Vain and presumptuous mortal, Hold !

For purposes my own,

To thee and thine unknown,

'Twas I that made thee strong and bold,

Above the rest extoll'd,

The terror of the world.

Enough ! thy course is o'er,

I hurl thee from thy pow'r ;

Unpitied, hail'd by all,

Shall be thy destin'd fall.

I give thee rashness for thy guide,

Thy armies shall be lost,

Like Pharaoh's countless host,

Whelm'd in Arabia's crimson tide.

Soon men of greater name,

Shall blast thy short-liv'd fame.

Their Eldest shall in speed,

Valour and martial deed,

Surpass thy Youngest band ;

For such is my command.

AIR. Thus spake the Lord of all ; and lo !
 The promis'd heroes rose,
 With thunder on their foes ;
 The el'ments clos'd the scene of woe ;
 Crush'd is the tyrant's power ;
 His host returns no more."

An ode was also contributed by the author on the same occasion, which ends with the *end* of the Tyrant.

" WHEN Gallia's Chief his myriad-host survey'd,
 And Kings, in arms, at his command array'd ;
 On Scavia's soil his banners he unfurl'd,
 And on her sons his mighty thunders hurl'd.
 He rashly thought, her legions overthrown,
 And speedy fall would make the world his own.

" But Scavia boasted of a loyal race,
 Who met him breast to breast, and face to face :
 More valiant, and no less in battle skill'd,
 They smote the tyrant on th' ensanguin'd field :
 They wrested from his giant-grasping hand
 The prize of empire over sea and land.

" He, conquest, lawless sway, and plunder sought ;
 They, for their altars, king, and country fought.
 Heav'n smil'd upon their efforts, and they sav'd
 The nations, his ambition had enslav'd.

*Hail Commerce, Freedom, Peace !—and flourish all !
 For, he achiev'd his own, not Scavia's fall."*

This solemn festival terminated in a public dinner, after which the author, in his official capacity, as a Russian Consul, addressed the guests, and in the following words anticipated the conduct of Alexander, assigning at the same time the reasons for such anticipations :—

" Reflections arising from this well known disposition of the Russian Emperor, complete our joy by giving it the sanction of prudence and cool judgment ; for the immediate advantages of the present happy change are not likely to be *counteracted by the events with which futurity is pregnant*. Alexander cannot become the

persecutor of those, whom he rescued from persecution ; or withdraw his protection from those, who wish and deserve to have him for their protector. The greater the influence of Russia, the greater will be the security and happiness of nations. It is the limitation of her power in Europe which the great son of Chatham endeavoured to establish, from apprehensions altogether groundless, that has raised France to her dreadful eminence ; and this illustrious Statesman, who lived to be undeceived, never ceased to regret the error he thus committed. Russia, being in her natural state, and in no need of artificial or extraordinary means to sustain herself in a new and painful, though imposing, attitude, advances in her career with regular pace, removing obstructions immediately in her way, but leaving all other roads to the free use of her fellow-travellers. Her power therefore never can be so fatal as has been that of France, who, impelled by the revolution beyond her natural strength, required unnatural means to feed it, and thus became at length the monster of war, subsisting on the spoils of others, and devouring her own children in order to prolong her feverish existence. France appeared like some high frowning cliff whose snowy summit, suddenly heated, descends in overwhelming torrents, and leaves in the parent-mountain, and all around, the deep and melancholy traces of its devastating course. Russia, on the contrary, resembles an extensive, smiling plain, where waters, collected from natural springs, move gently on, and, receiving in their progress many a tributary stream, swell into a majestic river, dangerous when disturbed by tempest, but otherwise safe and peaceful, bearing on its bosom the labours and hopes of mankind, and distributing abundance and happiness through the regions it passes. Such then being the difference between these two powers, our joy is but a tribute to humanity, whose sufferings we have heretofore bewailed. It is an offering to Heaven, which in aiding the efforts of Russia has heard our prayers, *and rescued the world from that ruthless tyranny whose sway was as extensive, as its annihilation is unexampled.*"

While the reports from France were swelling Bonaparte's fresh forces, the author thus commented upon these reports in the *Boston Gazette* of April 8, 1813 :—

“ The latest intelligence from France “ is wonderful, most wonderful, and again most wonderful !” It is in France that we find soldiers springing up like mushrooms, nay much quicker ; for at the mere nod of Bonaparte, they have already been created, grown to maturity, and in a few weeks multiplied like Falstaff’s buckram knights, from 300,000 to 700,000 men, who, according to the *Moniteur*, will form an army twice as numerous as the one that was carried into Poland. As this last army, however, was stated in the 12th bulletin at 680,000, either the *Moniteur* commits now a small mistake, or the great Napoleon himself had then told something very much like a falsehood. We profess ourselves adepts in decyphering the French arithmetic, and will therefore save the *Moniteur* the trouble of correcting errors by doing it ourselves. The French calculation is, that France has 300,000 men in the interior, 300,000 in Spain, and 200,000 in Poland. Unless therefore the *Moniteur* means to reckon French prisoners remaining in Russia, the account will stand thus :

French army in Poland	-	-	-	-	000,000
Do. in France	-	-	-	-	100,000
Do. in Spain	-	-	-	-	100,000
					200,000

“ We are quite sure that this account is nearest to truth, as it is but fair to deduct 200,000 from France and Spain, knowing this to be the exact degree of superfluous embellishment with regard to Russia. We will leave the *Moniteur*, however, to its own insignificance, and come to Bonaparte’s own speech of Feb. 16th, opening with the destruction of more towns and cities, than can be counted on the map of Russia in twice the extent he passed.

“ This production, the very climax of wonder, where, besides so many cities being destroyed which never existed, the most decisive defeats are, by a word, converted into victories, and where the disasters, which might have “ broken (Napoleon’s) heart,” are so easily transferred to the elements, reminds us for the first time of the existence of Bonaparte, whose blood, chilled by the *frightful* climate of Russia, is resuming now its wonted current under the warmer influence of a southern latitude. It seems as if Napoleon, after staying two months at Paris, was just beginning to feel at home,

and to recover in some measure from the terroure with which the sight of a Cozak had inspired him, and from the pain which the Russian lash had inflicted upon his body. To a rhapsody, so characteristic of his Corsican Majesty, our answer, as far as the elements are concerned, has already been anticipated ; we shall, therefore, notice only the unusual reserve and caution, which the tyrant, ever since his return, has observed towards Russia, venting his spleen altogether on the Tartars and the English. Without inquiring whether this moderation proceeds from his having been chastised, humbled, and beaten into good manners, or from the mortifying conviction that he can no longer execute his threats against Russia, it is plain that the words "*Russia shall re-enter her frightful climate*" are intended to quiet the fears of his people, without subjecting him to any pledge which he despaired of redeeming. For, happen what will, Russia must, *some time or other*, re-enter her territories of her own accord ; and so bear him out in his assertion. The pompous declaration that he *will not abandon his allies*, means neither more nor less, that he will be under the necessity of *defending them, or rather himself in their territories, against the approaching Russians.*"

On the subject of the *vigorous* resistance of the French, as announced in Paris papers, the author has the following observation in the same Gazette of April 15, 1813 :—

"While Paris papers gravely announce that a *vigorous* resistance is making every where against the Russians ; that troops are flocking from all quarters to "set bounds to the Russian plan of invasion" (a confession rather inadvertently made) ; that Prussian Poland is in a state of profound tranquillity, and that no Russians had yet passed the Vistula as late as the 29th of January ; while Bonaparte threatens in his speech that "*Russia shall re-enter her frightful climate*," without however pledging himself to compel her to this retrograde step ; while, in imitation of the Russians, (it seems they can teach him sometimes) he proclaims the mighty and loyal contributions of his good cities, (about four horses from each upon an average !!) ; and while his creatures on this side of the Atlantic, swallow greedily every bait upon his hook, swell with repletion, and by their own bigness measuring that of their mas-

ter, wish to frighten all those who consider Napoleon as an old spider, no longer able to spin his web out of his own bowels—While all these things are occupying the mind of the timid, exciting the disgust of the wise, and delighting the “officiating priests” of the Corsican deity, behold ! the tidings from the north have reached our shores, the bubble is burst, and the hopes of democracy have vanished like the “baseless fabric” of a vision. Admiral Tchitchagoff commands the centre, Sacken the left, and Wittgenstein the right, notwithstanding the French accounts would have it, that this last general disagreed with Kutusow, because Kutusow was an *older* man, and because the French *gentlemen* at Pozen could not *penetrate the designs of the Russians ! ! !* The gentlemen in question have found by this time, that in Russia, as in other countries, the difference of age operates in favour of an older commander, that the designs of the Russians are easily *known* and *felt*, and Russian generals, one and all, always agree in *beating* the French, whenever they can overtake them.

“In truth, when the severity of the season, the excessive fatigue of pursuit, and the difficulty of supplies in a country so desolated by war, are duly considered, the conviction will be that the progress of the Russians, whether in skill or activity, has been altogether unexampled. From the 25th of December, which left them near Kowno, to the 14th of January, which brought them to Marienwarder, they have travelled the distance of 250 miles, being about 15 miles a day, notwithstanding the taking of Königsberg, and other French “winter quarters,” which must have materially retarded their march. We hear of no diseases, and of no complaints of any kind ; and therefore, drawing the most favourable conclusions with regard to the Russian staff and commissariat, the superior discipline of the soldiers, and the pre-eminent wisdom of their commanders, we have no fear of Bonaparte, disgraced as he is, *ever being able to contend against such men with any prospect of success*—men, who in 20 days, in the depth of a northern winter, have cleared the whole of East Prussia of its invaders, and made the Vistula already a witness of their victorious career. Though the official accounts do not carry the military operations farther than this river, *yet there can be no doubt that the Russians have pushed their successes far beyond it, and not only Warsaw, but Pozen,*

(the Viceroy's "head quarters") must have, soon after, fallen into their hands ; and the next arrivals will confirm this, in the manner that the last have confirmed the surrender of Elbing, Marienburg and Marienwarder. In short, Thorn, and the whole chain of fortresses on the Vistula, which the French pretend to have so well garrisoned, will share the same fate ; and instead of a key to the Russian empire, will serve as its barrier against French or any other aggression. Dantzick may hold out for a while, but must finally surrender without materially impeding the progress of the Russians, and without putting them to much expense, in blood or treasure. They have only to leave a sufficient army behind to prevent the garrison from making depredations on the country, and by pushing towards Berlin and Stettin, which places they will reach probably about the middle of February—they will cut off all the supplies, and every communication with Dantzick, whose garrison, thus insulated, in a hostile country, rather incumbered than benefitted by its numbers, and without the least prospect of relief, must sooner or later surrender at discretion, or evacuate the city before the Russians can get so far in front of it. In either case, therefore, the Russians will be masters of Dantzick—a place, in every point of view, the most important on the Vistula.

"The report of the king of Prussia's escape, is by no means improbable, as the French, since he has been carried to Breslaw, make no mention of him, or of his farther removal, which would be rendered necessary by the advance of the Russians. Bonaparte has a difficult part to act towards this king, as by restoring him, he would give Prussia a head, of whose co-operation with France he is at best doubtful ; and by removing the king, he would infallibly rouse and unite the whole kingdom of Prussia against himself, and throw it into the scale of Russia ; an event, which in spite of all his efforts, must and will take place. The entrance of the Russians into Berlin, will be the signal for all the Prussians to join the Russian standard. Bonaparte may cajole Francis, and he may kiss the shoe of the Holy Pontiff, the very man whom he a few weeks since treated like a slave ; but neither the friendship of Austria will answer his wishes, nor the prayers of the Pope, raise his warriors from the grave ; and thus, by enabling him to check the rapid progress of the Russian arms, afford some consolation to the weeping friends of the "supereminent" Napoleon."

A certain editor, undertook to predict the plan and manner of the Campaign in Germany, giving the victory beforehand to Bonaparte ; accordingly our author came out with the following remarks, in the Boston Gazette of May 6, 1813 :—

“ We promised to make some remarks upon the late predictions of this would-be oracle, concerning the event, manner, and issue of the approaching European campaign, that is, continued by the Russians, and to be resumed, when and where he can, by Bonaparte ; but, thank God, Kutusow and his brave soldiers have spared us the trouble of exposing the ravings of an impudent and ignorant pretender, by waking him from his dreams, and by pulling down his castles in the air as fast he builds them, and as soon as we have announced him to be an impostor. We take our pen merely to give him advice, that when next he lays down Bonaparte’s plan of operations on the Elbe, the Oder, and other rivers in Germany, he should ascertain first, whether these rivers, and Germany itself, are in Bonaparte’s power ; and should first assure himself that the uncivil Russians, by taking all these to themselves, would not spoil his fine calculations, conspicuous no less by their precision, than by their modesty ; and that Bonaparte and his Generals would not leave him in the lurch, and after a good deal of vapouring, run away from all their eligible positions, or talk of going to Frankfort, when they can not get even to Berlin. Mr. D——, before he ventures to make Bonaparte drive back the Russians to their frightful climate, and march to St. Petersburg as fast as he did to Moskow, will do well to consider *whether the Russians may not prove disobedient to his decree, and drive the French beyond the Rhine ; whether marching to St. Petersburg is not more difficult than marching to Paris ;* and whether by going there, Napoleon would not be farther from his resources, and slower in coming back to them. Finally, we recommend to Mr. D—— to think before he hazards an opinion, and to convince himself at what place the tide would turn, before he tells us of its turning and rolling back to Poland. If he thinks it natural that the tide should so turn, we can tell him that he is right ; for the tide has turned, and now flows back precisely to that place from which it has been, for years, inundating and desolating the European continent.—We also agree with him, that

there "are no resources on the Russian soil" for any but the Russians. Exoticks do not thrive there, and we verily believe, that he himself, inexhaustible as he is in resources, would starve there, and add his own to the heap of corpses bestrewing the roads in Poland. We shall not quarrel with him about his calling the Russians "slaves," provided he allows that they in no one instance resemble him ; and provided he is not inclined to dispute that a slave who prefers death to foreign slavery, is more to be envied than a freeman who lives only to be the voluntary slave of a foreign tyrant. We are not surprised that he, should on every occasion vent his spleen upon the memory of the venerable Souwarow, for it was Souwarow that taught the Russians to beat the French, and it is his spirit that to this moment inspires his countrymen with invincible courage on the field of battle ; but we cannot help expressing our wonder, that this same man should so far allow his passion to obscure his judgment, as to cast, by calling Souwarow "barbarian," obloquy and censure upon his own worthies, the French Generals, who were beaten by this barbarian, and who, at least some of them, had the magnanimity to confess it, and to do justice to his talents and conduct ; an assertion, which, if doubted, we can prove by reference to the French authorities."

In the Boston Gazette, of May 10, 1813, our Author gave to the Public, what he properly denominated "Prospects in Europe :—"

"Lest it should be said, that we are finding fault with the prospective reflections of others, on the probable state of Europe, without stating our own, or subjecting ourselves to the same hazard of being mistaken ; we are willing that our present sentiments should be recorded, tried by the subsequent events, and contrasted with the speculations, deriving their importance merely from being so eagerly countenanced by the Presidential paper at Washington.

"We claim no particular merit for having predicted that Prussia would cordially join in the Russian cause, and that Sweden would also follow her example, the cause being common, and the measure of resistance, a necessary result of French aggression, and of the restless impatience with which that aggression was endured. As little do we claim for having constantly derided the expectations

of Poland rising in favour of France, and of Finland being restored to the Swedish crown ; a country which, from its geographical situation, was rather an incumbrance, and which, according to our former opinion, partly confirmed by the subsequent language of Bernadotte himself, ought to have been ceded to Russia, long ago, by the milder process of negociation, and with a prospect of indemnity in Norway, more beneficial to the kingdom of Sweden. It is enough to remind the reader that these changes have already taken place ; and that they are a fair pledge of what may be said of other powers in anticipation. *Austria, if she does not join Russia, will not oppose her ; or, if inclined to take an active part at all, will unquestionably prefer to act with her, in spite of the matrimonial alliance so much relied upon, with Bonaparte.* Saxony is already occupied by the Russians, and her fugitive king is rendered a harmless enemy, and inefficient friend. *Denmark, by the advance of the Russian troops, will be separated from the rest of Europe ;* and far from being of any service to France, must consider it a favour to be allowed to remain neutral. In short, *by the non-resistance of some, and by the positive co-operation of others, among whom even Holland may be included, the whole of Germany, whether actively or passively, will be enlisted on the side of the Russians.* This we consider as a ground of conjecture, comparatively safe ; but, whatever may be the risk, we are not deterred from going a few steps further.

“ By the last advices, from the north and south of Europe, the progress of the Russians, appears to have been successful beyond example ; and can be sufficiently appreciated from a volume of evidence furnished even by the *Moniteur* itself. Persons acquainted with the difficulties of military operations in northern climates at this season, and in countries previously desolated by the enemy, can alone conceive the full importance and the extraordinary activity of the Russians, who in the depth of winter, from Dec. 25, to March 10, have passed the Vistula and the Oder, penetrated to Hamburgh, reached the Elbe, and traversed the distance of more than six hundred miles from the Niemen. It is no longer possible for the French to conceal their losses, or invent excuses for abandoning one position after another ; and even Napoleon's greatest admirers, who, under the pretext of winter-quarters, de-

voutly and successively followed him to Smolensko, Wilna, Warsaw, Konigsberg, Pozen, Frankfort, and farther, must now be tired of chasing the phantom of his "grand army," which has so constantly eluded their grasp, and which is no where to be found, except on paper. To prove how disproportionate has been the real to the nominal French force, announced in Paris papers, since the defeat in Poland, and no doubt intended merely to allay the fears and apprehensions of Frenchmen, we need only recur to 120,000 men, said to have been already collected near Wilna, to "cause the Russians to pause;" and to the various corps concentrated in East-Prussia and Saxony, which, on the approach of the Russians, it seems, vanished into the air like the witches of Macbeth, and left us a sort of a talisman, by the application of which we can instantly reduce to its diminutive size the poor little frog, that tries to swell and look, at least at a distance, like an enormous bull. Of this character is also the display of force, with which the Moniteur of March 17th, attempts to deceive all those, who are unwilling to reflect for a moment, that, if such force existed, it ought to have prevented the Russians from advancing; or, if it were distributed in garrisons, it is now rendered useless, by being already placed, some in the midst, and some in the rear of the Russian armies. Indeed, when we weigh the importance of preserving those of the German States, which furnished Bonaparte with vast supplies and resources, which served him as the means of aggression, and would now serve as the barrier of self-defence; when we find these allies abandoned in succession, and suffered, without a struggle, to drop off, one by one, and follow in the train of the victorious Russians; and when we recollect that it is the haughty conqueror, the daring, active, Bonaparte, that is thus rendered a passive spectator of the increasing demolition of his own work, we need not seek for any other proof, that his power of coercion is destroyed, and that nothing but stern absolute necessity, arising from the want of adequate force, could have produced on his part such unequivocal relinquishment of every essential advantage heretofore enjoyed, and now indispensable for the preservation of his own empire. It is evident that the Russians, who seem to be fully sensible how much is to be gained by that celerity of movement, which would not allow the enemy to take breath and recover his

strength, will, gain the Rhine, strip Bonaparte of every ally to the east of that river, and pause no longer than will be necessary for the main body to come up, and facilitate the concentration of forces. Their left will extend towards Wirtemberg and Baden [the former the birth-place of Alexander's mother the Empress Dowager, and the latter also the birth-place of his present Consort] ; their right will stretch towards the north so as to assist Holland, and maintain an open communication with the sea ; and their rear will be supported by the interior states of Germany. Surrounded thus by friends and relations, supplied by sea and land, commanding the good wishes of the inhabitants of the regions through which they pass, and, like a snow-ball, swelling in their progress—reversing all the circumstances of Bonaparte's advancing to Poland—they certainly will cross the Rhine, and press on a battle, which it is their interest now to seek, and Napoleon's—how the times are changed !—to decline. Men of military reputation in France, are of opinion, that he will not trust his new levies in a general engagement, and will act for some time on the defensive, until his remaining veterans in Spain can be brought to his assistance ; but though this is by far the wisest policy, *such is the situation of Bonaparte, such is his pride, and reluctance to undeceive the world and the French people on the score of his means and talents, and such is his characteristic rashness and confidence in fortune, that we think upon the whole, he will meet the Russians on the field as soon as he can command any force of consequence against them.* We leave it to the deep foreknowledge and keen foresight of the never-erring D——, to note with precision, at what particular place the battle will be fought, what will be the course and direction of columns on both sides, in how many divisions the respective armies will march, and from what spot, or at what time exactly they will start ; but we undertake to say, that Bonaparte's threat, to punish the Russians for their rhodomontades, will not be executed to the satisfaction of himself or his friends ; and that *if he ventures on a great battle, his final overthrow will be accelerated, and the most auspicious issue to mankind in general may be anticipated, without any fear of disappointment.* It is not, to use D——'s phraseology, “in the nature of things that any other result should follow.”

During this interval, was re-published in this country "The Edinburgh Review," containing a scurrilous review of the author's "Resources of Russia." As he had the advantage of the first attack upon the reviewers, and thus precluded every suspicion that his sentiments concerning them might have in the sequel originated from their abuse of his work, he treated their splenetic ebullition, as a thing fully expected by him, with silent disdain, and with that consciousness of triumph which proceeded from the events having fully verified his political creed, in direct opposition to theirs. He treated their language and efforts to assail him, as the language and efforts of embittered disappointment and defeat. Perceiving, however, that his silence, mistaken for submission, encouraged some of the inferior satellites of the Edinburgh reviewers, in this country, to open their puny batteries upon him, he at once scorned the insects hanging on the leaves of a tree, and laid his axe to the tree itself: that is, he wrote his "Reply to the Edinburgh Reviewers," and thereby silenced all the rest.

We have no hesitation to express our opinion, that he has been successful in exposing their mis-statements, total want of candour, and real or pretended ignorance of Russian and European affairs in general; or, to adopt his own expression, "*their awkward facetiousness, egregious ridiculousness, too poetical imagination, general inconsistency, and conspicuous absurdity.*" In short, he every where brings his solitary strength against the united force of these ci-devant giants, and stakes his reputation against theirs upon the further issue of events.

On the subject of Austria he thus refutes them, and hints at the probability of her joining Russia against France, page 9:—

"Precisely of the same character is their rhapsody about the Austrian fears and jealousies of Russia; a power, who, according to their system, never can be equal to France, and yet more to be feared than France!! The Edinburgh reviewers may shew much ingenuity in reconciling this palpable contradiction; but it requires more influence than they possess, or ever will possess, to persuade any person of common sense and reflection, that the fear of one who never wronged us, never took up arms against us, never seized upon any of our possessions, but

has been a long-trying friend, guided, even in moments of anger and dissatisfaction, by principles of honour and moderation—that the fear of one who bravely, generously, and repeatedly shed his best blood in our cause, can even for a moment counterbalance the fear of a powerful, unprincipled, and experienced enemy, the resentment of past injuries, the painful consciousness of present humiliation, the mortifying conviction of increasing aggression, and the anticipated horror of future misery. The Edinburgh reviewers, it seems, have yet to learn, *that the apprehension of what Russia may possibly undertake hereafter, is very different from the certainty of what has been, or is to be inflicted on Austria by the implacable ruler of France*, urged rather to claim as his own, than spare the mutilated fragments of her empire, in virtue of that fatal and degrading bond of consanguinity, which has enchained her to his bloody car, and imparted a certain fascination to the real cause of terror, which frightened her from every exertion favourable to her friends, and conducive, ultimately, to her own safety.”

Page 20, the author proceeds thus :—

“ The *irresistibility of France* has long been the pretext with the party to justify their refusal of assistance to the continent ; and a cloak to cover their reluctance to oppose France in her career ; so that it is not for want of their good wishes and measures that she is not irresistible. This precious quality of *irresistibility*, which, like a woman’s honour, cannot be impaired without being destroyed, has been severely tried, as far back as the year 1799, by the old Suwarow in Italy ; but “ the talents,” or the Edinburgh reviewers, which is the same thing, still preached its durability to the world. It was rather rudely questioned at the battles of Pultusk and Eylau, but the Edinburgh reviewers still preached, until they preached away the friendship of Russia, and then, with an ideotic stare stood incredulous, or wilfully heedless of the mischief they had accomplished. The battle of Aspern, so honourable to Austria, was likewise a bitter test ; but still they preached on ; until, at length, the veteran Kutusow had rent the veil with his native sword, stripped naked the preaching fanaticks and impostors, and left them no alterna-

tive but to plead error or hypocrisy. Nay, had he lived longer, he would have anticipated *the proof of time*, in showing that France is even *vulnerable* ; for, whatever hopes they may entertain of her convalescence through the temporary success of Bonaparte, they may be assured, that *France herself cannot easily recover the blow she received in the last campaign, the effects of which I have elsewhere endeavoured to foretel, and see no reason to change my opticks of futurity.* Bonaparte may recover, he may by an intrigue with his weak father-in-law, by a temporary peace, or even by arms, preserve his own political existence, brilliant as ever in *appearance* ; but, *every moment he lives, every mangled corpse he adds to the pile which props up his tottering throne, is fatal to France ; and every drop, feeding the tide of blood that keeps afloat his bark of despotism, is drawn from the veins, from the very heart of France, who, if not speedily relieved, must sink from total exhaustion.* There is a power that evidently protects Bonaparte, for some purposes as yet to be accomplished ; and twice it sent Death to save him, by removing Suwarow and Kutusow from his way, both at two critical periods which seemed to threaten his destruction. If it be not, therefore, impious to scan the unrevealed decrees of Providence, a belief may be indulged, that it is to *chastise other offending nations, then to punish France herself, the guiltiest of them all, and end, perhaps for ever, the tyrannical influence she has so long exercised over the European world,* that Heaven still preserves, and still permits the demon of ambition, while he makes her a scourge to the rest, to feed upon her vitals, and not to quit his hold, until, fleshless and juiceless, she is cast off, like a withered leaf, a prey to every puff and gust of wind. It will be found, that her conscription system, and her internal, but not eternal resources, strained within, and unsupported without, whereon the Edinburgh reviewers, and other better men, misled by them, have founded her *imaginary invincibility and Bonaparte's irresistible power, are but the life-stream of a bleeding giant, which in its torrent, though it overwhelms the insects within reach, weakens himself, and must, in the end, terminate his own existence.*

“ As to the *incompetency of Russia to defend herself, and resist France, from what has been said in the preceding paragraph,*

or rather, from what has been done by Russia in the face of the whole world, it would be now a superfluous multiplication of words to tell the Edinburgh reviewers that they were willing or ignorant enough to be mistaken, and have not had so much magnanimity, or even common decency, as to acknowledge their error. It would be equally superfluous to give another proof of their *admirable foresight* as to Spanish affairs ; for it was a part of the same political system with them, that *Spain could not be defended.*"

In the last page but one, he thus concludes his " Reply " :—

" From what has been stated in the preceding pages, in explanation of the factious motives and views of the Edinburgh reviewers and their friends, no one can be at a loss, why they have uniformly endeavoured to fix the odium of the partition of Poland exclusively upon Russia, treating Austria and Prussia, who participated in the spoil, with comparative lenity ; or why, profiting by the event which excited every where so great a sensation, they have, in contradiction to themselves, held up, as highly dangerous, the Russian power, which, on other occasions, they have affected to despise. It is sufficient to observe, that the influence of Russia was inauspicious to their interests at home ; and, therefore, they resolved to make war upon her moral and political character, in which resolution they have ever persevered.* Unfortunately, their efforts were but too well seconded by the ferment which previously existed in the public mind, and in such a degree, that Mr. Pitt himself, hurried away with the torrent, appeared in opposition to Russia, and by checking her progress in Turkey, unwittingly contributed to the raising of that stupendous fabrick of French grandeur, which he afterwards in vain laboured to demolish. Painful experience, though too late, has proved that he was mistaken in his calculations, and

* " On one occasion only they deviated from this resolution : it was when Mr. Pitt declared himself against Russia, and thus converted Mr. Fox into her temporary friend ; which plainly shows that all the actions of the dangerous faction to which the Edinburgh reviewers have attached themselves, have no other object but to oppose the existing administration in order to get the government into their own hands."

that Russia,—there being a necessity, as long as France exists, of a counteracting check to her aggrandizement,—is the only power (not Austria, as the Edinburgh reviewers feigned) capable, with the moderate support of others, to give this beneficial check. She is also the most eligible for this purpose ; for, whatever her ambition or projects may be, it is certain, that lawless and wanton usurpation, for the mere pleasure or lust of conquest, is totally incompatible with her essential interests and pursuits. The increase of population, progress of commerce and civilization, promotion of agriculture, and every improvement relating to internal industry, all depending on the state of peace, have been her constant and undeviating aim ; consequently, a power, with so sacred an object in view, never can be destructive to her neighbours. Add to this, that she is in her natural state, and not excited, like France, to that feverish energy, which is and must be kept up by forced and artificial means, fatal to all who breathe within her atmosphere. The very circumstance of Russia's dividing her spoils with others, proves her far less dangerous than France, who, whenever she can, takes all ; while the improved condition of Russian Poland, though it shows the ambition of Russia, shows also the more lenient nature of that ambition, robbed of its terror by the good to which it aspires. It is clear, therefore, that whatever Dr. Clarke, or the Edinburgh Reviewers, have advanced to the contrary ; they themselves, if not influenced by opposite interests, would confess that *Russia is the only continental power, whose moral and physical energies, with a view to the past, present, or future, entitle her to the hopes and confidence of Europe.*"

A few weeks after the "Reply to the Edinburgh reviewers," our author translated the official Russian Pamphlet which we have alluded to, and annexed to it his "Strictures on the Correspondence respecting Russia," published by Mr. Walsh of Philadelphia, as we think, in an unfortunate moment for this gentleman. After convicting Mr. Walsh of self-contradiction, and still more palpable aberrations than those of the Edinburgh reviewers, between whom and him, no one can for a moment mistake a political union of sentiment, originated on one hand, and borrowed on the

other, the author in the page 114, thus places himself in opposition to Mr. Walsh :—

“ When a writer undertakes to speculate upon futurity, and to trace on the map of time the course of a great nation, expecting that he would carry the public along with him ; he ought at least to have given some pledge of his past correctness, and some security, that those who may place their confidence in his foresight may not be deceived. It is not to be expected, that any writer, unless inspired from above, can foretell every thing with certainty ; but the mistake into which he necessarily falls, must be redeemed by some prominent truths and leading events verifying the most essential parts of his predictions : else he cannot, with any semblance of propriety, set up a public claim to divination. What is Mr. Walsh’s claim in this particular ? The very subject of which he treats, and proposes farther to treat, is that in particular, on which he has been mistaken, scarcely with one exception. His remarks on the means and energies of Russia, in his letter on the “ Genius of the French government”—in which remarks I instantly recognized the sentiments of the Foxites or Edinburgh reviewers, and, in substance, the very language of the Morning Chronicle—show him not only deficient in knowledge, with respect to Russia, and convict him, by every succeeding event, of fallacy in his statements, reasonings, and anticipations ; but, what militates still more against his claim, they show him unrepentant, uninstructed by experience, and obstinately persevering in the same illusive doctrine. So early as the time referred to, he was already enslaved by prejudices borrowed from the English opposition-party, with whom he unfortunately associated, and by a certain system of his own creation, so far as to betray the same want of candour which he has since displayed without even a blush : for, in drawing a comparison between the military prowess of France, and that of Russia, he stated only such battles as were in favour of the former, and studiously, and therefore intentionally, suppressed all such as were in favour of the latter. I flattered myself, however, that in all this, there was less ill will than weakness, arising from an extreme desire to establish a favourite system ; and Mr. Walsh must be sensible of my delicacy towards him, since I have carefully foreborne to remind him of his aberrations, though to do so, in

treating of the subjects which continually brought me into contact with him, I felt myself more than once very strongly tempted.

“ With regard to France, Mr. Walsh’s claim is scarcely less questionable. It is true, that here, no longer confiding in others, he trusts himself, inspects every thing with his own eyes ; and, in matters of fact, displays extensive knowledge, uncommon information, acuteness of research, a preeminence of industry, and felicity of selection : but the moment he quits these, and attempts to convert the real causes into ideal effects, precisely the point on which his claim now is to be tried, he loses himself in an ocean of uncertainty, steers no settled course, and arrives at any port, but the one of original destination. From his own clear facts, and able premises, he draws altogether opposite conclusions ; and from the very oppression, tyranny, fiscal burthens, stagnation of commerce, and the consequent reduction of resources, so well observed by him, and so well described, he deduces the national grandeur and power of France, and predicts (among other things, not quite *realized*) her subjugation of the Spaniards. He delineates her horrible system of conscription with unsparing accuracy : yet, on this very system, fixes her invincibility and irresistibility, forgetting, that a temporary *paroxysm of madness, though outrageous in the extreme, obnoxious to the bystanders, and scarcely to be restrained by any external force, leaves the patient, in the end, proportionably weak, weary, and exhausted.* If Mr. Walsh is not already sensible of this truth, he *may be soon made so* ; and his *pretensions* to unveil futurity, not established by the past, or the present, *will be totally done away by what is likely to happen at no distant period of time.* One would suppose that predictions escape his lips or pen, only to be falsified by every arrival from Europe, and scarcely had his first letter made its appearance, than a torrent of fresh events deformed all its features, and left that of his opponent (Mr. Harper) a firm and conspicuous rock of triumph. When will Mr. Walsh learn prudence ? ”

Page 120, the author concludes his strictures in the following manner, reiterating the opinions he formerly expressed in his address to the Bostonians, as to the comparative danger from France and Russia :—

“ If Mr. Walsh reasons only as a severe moralist, not allowing that a nation without ambition is like a body without a soul, and that it is as easy for him to exclude that ambition as to annihilate the passions of an individual ; he must condemn every nation on earth, for every nation has made occasional conquests, from imperial France to the republican states of America, whose rulers, though but young beginners, have no objection to put on the conqueror’s boots, and to march to Florida or Canada.

“ But, if Mr. Walsh speaks, as a statesman, of nations as they are, and always have been, not as what they ought to be, as they never have been, and never can be ; the only consideration then is, whether the ambition of one nation is better or worse regulated, induced by stronger or weaker motives of excitement, and more or less fatal in its tendency to others, than the ambition of another : let us then for a moment take this view of France and Russia.

“ France preys upon others in order to prolong her present political existence, and to find abroad that food which begins to fail at home, from the unnatural increase of her appetite : Russia uses others only as barriers to defend what she possesses, and to secure, not to prolong, her political existence, supported by natural nourishment. France seeks conquests as the sources of life, as the atmosphere without which she cannot breathe : Russia seeks them as the enjoyments of life, with which she can dispense, and as the means of embellishment which she can easily resign. France spares nothing in her career from good to ill ; Russia, who according to Mr. Walsh himself, must grow better to arrive at the dangerous point of her power, *saves all she can, in her progress from ill to good.* France, like a fierce volcano, preys upon her own entrails, and, in wild eruptions, destroys all around her to an immense distance : Russia, healthy within, increases in size, *by the strength and regular growth of youth, and either embraces others in her way, or displaces, without destroying them.* France preys upon commerce, wastes all the comforts of life, and hurls herself and the surrounding nations, from freedom to despotism, and from knowledge to ignorance : *Russia cherishes commerce, seeks the comforts of life, and, in raising herself, must also raise others, from despotism to freedom, and from ignorance to knowledge.* In short, France commenced her descent, fatal to her neighbours, from the zenith

of civilization : Russia on the contrary, ascends from the nadir of barbarism, and has not yet attained the height of civilization to which she aspires. If this contrast be not imaginary, and I feel confident it is not ; who can hesitate a moment to choose between these two powers ?

“ I perfectly agree with Mr. Walsh, as to the future reduction of French power, and I rest my opinion precisely upon the grounds which he himself has furnished in support of the irresistibility of that power. I have already said, and repeat it again, that Bonaparte has done much towards the ruin of France, and will finally consummate it, if he lives longer : but this by no means proves that Russia is to succeed her in the unprincipled and wanton course of aggression ; first, because such a course is incompatible with the essential interests of Russia : secondly, because, as Mr. Walsh acknowledges, in contradiction to himself, “ there is a better chance of escaping from her ; ” in other words, independent of the probable check of dismemberment, there will be sufficient checks against her even in the power of Austria ; for it is evident, that the reduction of French power can never take place, *without increasing the power of Austria in correspondent proportion.*”

We will now follow the Author to that momentous suspense, which preceded the invasion of France by the Allies, and during which they issued their famous declaration, the spirit of which was misapprehended in London. On this subject there appeared in Boston papers certain speculations from the London “ Courier,” intimating a defection in the Allies from the common interest of Europe ; which speculations, being erroneously considered here as emanating from some ministerial or official source, produced general discontent and despondence. Our Author, ever at hand to counteract unfavourable and unfounded impressions, immediately addressed the public through the medium of the Boston Gazette, Feb. 10, 1814, as follows :—

“ Public anxiety, and expectation of great news, were prodigiously increased by the mysterious conduct of the speculators and original holders of the English papers, received by the late arrival ; but when the veil of secrecy was removed, and the “ great news”

proved to be little more than a bubble, despondence and the vexation of disappointment immediately succeeded, and drove back the tide of public opinion, leaving anger alone to rear his fulminating head from the dry land, which so lately was overflowed with joy and exultation. The Allies are already denounced as infamous traitors to Great Britain, and to Sweden ; and the exploits of the latter two, are extolled to the very sky, far above the exploits of the other three, for the mere pleasure of a more striking and effectual condemnation ! Is this just ! is this generous ! Is it possible that the character of Alexander has gained as yet so little in the public estimation, as to be suspected of wanton treachery—and upon what grounds ? Upon the declaration of the Allies to Bonaparte ; upon the speech of the latter to the senate ; and upon the comments of the Courier. Let us for a moment examine these !

“ The declaration of the Allies is only a repetition of the declarations formerly made by them ; and it pledges them to nothing that is incompatible with the interests of Great Britain. The British government, according to the minister’s own assurances in Parliament, were privy to all the final views and projects of the Allies, and of course have sanctioned them. What have then the Allies done by their offer to Bonaparte ? Nothing more than merely offering a basis to treat upon, previously adjusted between them and Great Britain, reserving the final settlement of details for the special concurrence of each interested party. The point of time, at which such an offer should be made, must also have been left to the discretion of the Allies on the spot ; and they merely exercised this discretion, as to time, without going a step further. England is in the situation of a partner at home, who has given powers to his other partners abroad to settle some momentous business, and to make advances towards the same ; and it by no means follows, that she is to be excluded from the settlement, merely because in making an offer to settle, they did not specially consult her, having in truth no occasion to consult her on a subject on which she had already granted her consent. *The apprehensions, therefore, arising from the declaration of the Allies, are altogether unfounded.*

“ As to the speech of Bonaparte, what is it but such a speech as he would be expected to make, and such as he has often made ?

Why does he withhold from the public, the original documents, containing the offered and accepted basis? Why does he talk of delay in the assembling of the Congress, just as he talked of the expected Congress at Prague? Why does he adhere with such earnestness to the possession of Italy, when its cession must be the *sine qua non* in the basis offered to him? From this speech, a person of discernment *can see any thing sooner than a prospect of peace*. Some gentlemen here, have mounted the stilts of giant fear, and have already predicted the coalition of all the European powers against Great Britain; their inveterate jealousies of her; the revival of that horrid phantom, armed neutrality; and the unconditional demand from her of the restoration of all the colonies she conquered from France. Really there is a great deal of fancy in this. Whatever may be the conduct of Austria, with whom, we are satisfied, the first defection must eventually originate, Alexander is still the soul of the coalition; and we are yet to learn what inveterate jealousy Russia ever entertained of Great Britain, whose interest has always been reciprocal, whose mutual friendship has been steady and regular, and whose mutual disagreements were merely exceptions to the regular course of their common policy. We should also wish to know what could Alexander gain by England's giving up her conquered colonies, of which not a single one belongs, or would belong to him? What sudden excess of generosity towards France should outweigh his positive obligations towards Great Britain; and what compensation the prosperity of France would be to him for the loss of his whole fleet, which is now in Great Britain, and which of course would be retained there in case of his rupture with her, inevitable from the indulgence of such extraordinary affections for her rival? Sense and reason must be subverted before such fears can be supposed to be well grounded.

“The Courier's remarks are very much honoured in being allowed to produce such effect on the public opinion here. However, they are but the remarks of an individual, an editor of a paper, penned upon the spur of the occasion, and in his usual manner. But it is said, the Courier is an official paper: this is not true. The London Gazette is the only official paper in London; and the Courier is merely a paper, whose politics are favourable to the ministerial party, and beyond this, has no communication whatever

with the government. After all, the Courier's remarks amount merely to a slight apprehension of the wavering policy of Austria (a thing exceedingly probable) and do not extend to Alexander and Frederick ; while the expression " Great Britain and Sweden appear not to have been consulted," is a mere supposition, which, whether true or not, naturally explains itself, by what we have already suggested. Great Britain, however, must evidently have been consulted, through her Ambassador on the spot, even as to the offer itself ; but it is also evident that Lord Cathcart's communications, to the government at home, particularly if any misunderstanding has prevailed between Austria and the other Allies, would not be divulged to the public, through the Courier or any other paper whatever : and would produce the effect, which has actually appeared in the personal departure of the prime minister. The editor therefore reasons as most editors do. from his own surmises, and judges from appearances, because the facts are concealed from his knowledge.

" Let us then do justice to the Allies, and not condemn them upon mere insinuations : let us wait a little longer, and we are confident *the final issue will bear us out in the opinion, that no perfidious desertion of Great Britain and Sweden is contemplated, or will be suffered by the Allies, as long at least as Alexander is one of the number.*"

The news of the Allies having at length passed the " Rubicon," and thus justified the confidence which the author claimed for them, had scarcely reached America, when he gave the following climax of his prophecies, in the " Boston Daily Advertiser" of March 14, 1814, which is as singular and unexpected, as the events which consummated its fulfilment, are extraordinary and unprecedented :—

" All our anticipations, as well as our assurances to the publick, that no premature or dishonourable peace was intended by the Allies, have been completely verified. It is as plain as day, that the Allies have *denounced Bonaparte* before the French people ; and thus have given a pledge that *no peace* will be made with the

Tyrant upon any terms. His complaints, as reported to the Conservative Senate, put beyond all doubt that the Allies have issued a manifesto, the contents of which will be found *consolatory to the French people, expressive of respect for their rights and liberties, disdaining every invasion of France for the purposes of conquest or dismemberment, and making the war personal against the despotical usurper, and in favour of the French nation which he has enslaved. Bonaparte must be hurled from his sanguinary throne before any peace can be concluded ; and his fate has accordingly been predetermined. As he has not shewn a single instance of that magnanimity which would induce us to believe that he would sooner die by his own hand, than bear his humiliation—we foresee no other alternative left him but to be slain by others, or escape by flight (to America.) The Allies are already on the road to Paris ; and nothing can check them but a peace terminating in Bonaparte's political annihilation.*—One part of the Allied Army already has advanced from Basle to Befort, and another is marching through Lyons to the same point, commencing at a broad base, and proceeding by two roads, which form an angle at Paris, so as to reunite them at that capital. There are no obstructing fortresses in the way ; and if there were, *the Allies have force enough to leave troops in the rear to watch them, while the main force is marching forward, according to the plan they have uniformly pursued.*—The left wing will probably co-operate with the Austrian army in Italy, so as to cut off the Viceroy and his army with one stroke ; *while Bernadotte will advance from Holland through the Netherlands to the same point of union—Paris.*

“ There are some who fear the consequences of entering France, for various reasons, to which it is not necessary here to allude ; to such we shall give a short reply.

“ The present invasion of France is not like that of the Duke of Brunswick ; because, while the invading force is much greater, not only the means of resistance on the part of France are much smaller, but the enthusiasm which prevailed in the French people is now totally destroyed. The unsuccessful invasion of Russia, by Bonaparte, has likewise no analogy to the invasion of France, but rather helps the conclusion as to the success of the latter. Bonaparte went to Russia for the purpose of conquest ; he had to encounter a nation whose resources were in full bloom, whose armies

were all reserved for the final contest, and whose loyalty could not be shaken by a temporary occupation of the Russian provinces. He had to deal with a sovereign, who, to the just cause of self defence, had legitimate and personal claims on his people's affection. Do any of these apply to the present state of France or her Tyrant? No. France is invaded *for the purpose of deliverance, and not of conquest* ; and *Russia is the surest guarantee of the promised integrity of the French empire* ; for, as *Russia, from her local situation, cannot hold any part of it, she will never consent to its dismemberment in favour of others*, and thereby labour for their aggrandizement to the prejudice of her own interests. France, besides, is invaded after the French armies have been destroyed ; when her resources, effective population, and materials for the army have been woefully exhausted ; and *when their Tyrant has neither personal nor legitimate claim on the love of the French people*. We have seen that Lord Wellington's invasion not only has not produced the so much dreaded rise of the French people *en masse*, but rather approximated him to their good will, manifested in their supplying him with all the necessities of life. *We shall see, therefore, the same conduct of the French peasantry towards the Allies, who, as they advance, will be hailed as liberators, rather than opposed as enemies, and unite the inhabitants in one sentiment hostile to Bonaparte, and propitious to the restoration of the ancient monarchy*. This naturally brings us to the consideration of the probable ulterior views of the Allies.

“ It is supposed, not without reason, that Austria will resist any change of government, to the exclusion of Napoleon's young offspring, the grand-son of the Austrian Emperour ; and we have no doubt that the Allies have given a pledge to Austria in favour of her ambitious pretensions in the person of the young King of Rome. This pledge, however, has been already redeemed by their offers of peace to Bonaparte, with an additional view of putting him still further in the wrong, should he refuse. He has done so by claiming Italy as his own ; and we see Austria united with *the rest, to hurl him down from his throne*. *His fall we deem now certain ; the rest must depend upon the will of the French people, and this is the chance on which Austria has been compelled to rely*. *If the French nation wish for Napoleon's son to govern it,*

Austria's views will be promoted by the Allies : *but if the French nation call for the Bourbon family, the Allies who have pledged themselves not to interfere in the choice of government by the people, will undoubtedly restore Louis XVIII, and Austria will have no alternative but to submit, and submit she must.* It is a peculiar trait of wisdom in the conduct of the Allies, that they have carefully concealed their final projects, in such a way as to be at liberty, without violating any previous pledge or offending the pride of the French nation, to regulate those projects by the circumstances and events which may arise from the progressive state of their affairs."

The boldness of these last predictions, having so deeply involved the author's reputation, it was supposed, he would be content to wait for their realization without venturing any further ; but he, only a few days after, intended to surprise the public with other predictions still more remarkable for their minuteness, which can scarcely be believed to have entered his head or that of any other man, but which like others are completely verified. They were sent to the same paper, but, being returned, were not published till the 9th of June in the Boston Gazette. We give them place here according to their original intention :—

" In the Daily Advertiser, of 14th March, we ventured to foretell the entrance of the allies into Paris, the restoration of the ancient monarchy in France, and even the probable escape of Bonaparte from Europe, and his final appearance in America. Though these opinions were deemed at that time full of extravagance, they become less so with each arrival from Europe, and the last prediction, though qualified with certain contingencies, is the only one that remains as yet involved in doubt and improbability. On this subject it is sufficient only to ask, where is there another spot on earth where Bonaparte would be received, in case he should evade the sword of his enemies, and the fury of his own subjects ? Leaving, however, his fate to the disposal of Providence, we will hazard two predictions more, in hopes of relieving the anxiety of those, who, not without reason, apprehend the destruction of Paris, and of those monuments of arts which are deposited in that metropolis. As Alexander, by the confession of the French themselves, is the

principal mover of the coalition, and consequently the arbiter of the fate of France ; his well known character, no less than the motives of policy, which we shall shortly explain, warrant us in our assurance, *that Paris will be spared and respected ; and that the pictures and statues which rendered famous the territories formerly possessing them, will not only be saved, but restored to their original repositories, whence the hand of Napoleon had dragged them to the French Capital.*

“ Farther, we hesitate not to express our belief, that if any mischief is done to Paris, by conflagration or any other means, it will be caused either by useless resistance on the part of the city, *or by the spite and vengeance of Bonaparte himself, should his remaining satellites be daring enough to execute his sanguinary orders.*

“ The motives of policy which must influence Alexander in restoring the monuments of arts are too obvious to be overlooked, supposing that his magnanimity was questioned. There are some masterpieces which are invaluable, and could not be divided, or possessed by any one of the allies, without exciting jealousy and discontent in the others ; consequently the restoration of them to their original places will be the best and easiest method of reconciling all the parties, at the same time of preserving the consistency of those professions which have been made and reiterated by the allies. The greatest danger to France must hereafter be apprehended from the ambition and neighbourhood of Austria, who will have gained in proportion to the weakness of the French power. Russia alone can and will check every such attempt upon the independence of France.”

At this time unfavourable rumours, through Bermuda, reached this country, of the defeat and retreat of the Allies from France ; and while the news, believed by many, produced much alarm and agitation among the well-affected to the great common cause, our author again appeared in the character of a consoler, in the “ Boston Gazette” of April 21, 1814, where he says :—

“ The late report, via Bermuda, about the defeat and retreat of the allies, has been received, we think, with more credit than it deserves. There is a constant influx of false and contradictory ru-

mours in England ; there are, besides, many newspapers disaffected to the government, which catch at any thing favourable to Bonaparte. We ought, therefore, to assure ourselves first, of the report having been actually brought to Bermuda, and then, of the source from which it originally came, before we can permit ourselves to reason for a moment upon the supposed defeat. There are facts, officially known to the world, which are better than any private information, and which are totally at variance with any supposition to the disadvantage of the allies. By the late arrival from Paris, up to the 9th of February, we are certain that Bonaparte had then no army numerous enough to engage the allies in a general battle ; *it is morally therefore impossible that in a few days he could have mustered such an army. He might possibly have increased his number by detachments from Soult ; and if the allies were defeated, and retreated 90 miles, the time required for these operations would scarcely allow them to be known in London before March 1, up to which it is said the papers were brought to Bermuda.* As for the pretended firing on the French coast ; it might have been occasioned by the approach of the British ships in the channel, which is often the case. At all events it can have no connexion with the supposed defeat of the allies, as the firing was announced in London on the 11th of February, and on the 9th, which is our latest date from Paris, there was not the smallest appearance of an engagement, as the hostile armies were not even near enough for such a purpose. Who can then believe that from the 9th to the 10th a great battle could have been fought, and the news of its result already conveyed to the coast ? *The utmost that we can allow for this report, is, that it may have originated in the repulse of some small corps, or in the retreat of the advanced bodies, who kept a head near 40 miles, and on meeting with any considerable force, would naturally fall back upon the main army."*

So little was our author dismayed by these unfavourable reports, that at this very time of doubt and suspense, he produced on the stage an operative melo-drama, in three acts, entitled " The Cozaks on the road to Paris," the spirit of which may be judged from the speech, which he puts into the mouth of the Cozak chief, thus addressing the inhabitants of Fontainebleau :—

“Dismiss your fears ! *We are your friends. It is not against France that we are armed, but against her tyrants and oppressors. Frenchmen ! some of you have done our country much harm, but this we have forgotten, and remember only to serve yours. It is true, a full retaliation is now in our power ; but we scorn it. A nobler vengeance brings us here. We come to break your own chains, and restore you to that freedom, of which you have attempted to deprive us at home.*”

The above extract not only shows how well our author understood the character of Alexander, but it shews that sentiments of such unexampled forbearance and magnanimity, as were soon after displayed in the concluding events, were not confined to the breast of one Russian ; and thus furnishes the keenest comment upon all those who have endeavoured here and in England, to belie and vilify the Russian character.

The author concludes this piece with a chorus sung by the French peasants in honour of Alexander, which is a complete anticipation of what has since taken place at Paris. It was arranged to the tune of the celebrated *Russian Polonesso*.

“Long live Alexander !

Long live the deliverer !

Glorious 'mong the kings he blazes,
Distant nations sing his praises,
Millions bless his noble deeds.

Peace bestrews his path with roses,
Justice 'neath his shield reposes,
Freedom lives, oppression bleeds.

Mercy from his heart is flowing,
Good for ill he is bestowing,
Heav'n his virtuous triumph speeds.

Gallia joins the lauding voices,
And with Europe now rejoices :
For she is no more enslav'd,
Conquer'd only to be sav'd.”

When, at length, the French official accounts up to February 28th, received here, seemed to confirm the preceding reports of the defeat and retreat of the allies, and made the most confident men despair, our author stood forth unshaken in the grounds of his former belief, and thus endeavoured to revive the public hopes, in the Boston Gazette of April 25, 1814, describing the respective positions and movements of the contending parties, with the probable results of their final operations, exactly as they were found afterwards to have actually taken place :—

“ The late arrival from France brings us a chaos of news, which cannot be easily reduced to order ; nor shall we attempt it. It is sufficient that our surmises of Thursday last are amply confirmed, as to the supposed check given to the allies, which at most we considered as partial, and confined to some advancing troops falling-back. About the middle of February there was likewise so much boasting in the French papers, as fully to explain the rumours which reached us from England, but which are entirely done away by the later dates from France. As the French official accounts are so scanty, a circumstance decidedly unfavourable to Bonaparte ; and as the unofficial paragraphs are altogether unworthy of notice, at least it never has been our habit to reason upon them, we shall take some prominent facts, which, being established by these accounts, will form so many pivots for our general remarks.

“ The first fact is, that there has been no general battle. A mere skirmishing cannot decide the fate of the campaign. The French naturally would exaggerate their successes in partial actions with more impunity, as there is less danger of detection ; but, though we are satisfied *the next British accounts will give a different complexion even to all these actions, the final result will not be in any practical degree influenced by them.* A general engagement must swallow up all successes on either side, and this has not yet taken place. The hostile armies, however, are evidently manœuvring for it, and all the various small encounters with which the French papers are filled, are only precursory movements to that dreadful conflict, which will, with one blow, *hurl Bonaparte from his eminence,* or drive the Allies from France. Let us, then, wait with patience for the event of such a battle.

“ The second part is, that *there is no negociation for peace*. This of itself speaks a volume in favour of the Allies. It is not to be doubted that, if they were checked, they would seriously encourage a negociation with Bonaparte, whose dethronement would then be hopeless.

“ The third fact is, that *the Allies have not retreated* ; at least not upon the general scale.—On the contrary, some of their troops are now much nearer to Paris than they were before. To the question, whether Bonaparte can compel them to a retreat, we would reply by a reference to the battle of Brienne. There Bonaparte had collected the best of his army, and yet Blucher alone, with only a reinforcement from the main Bohemian army, was more than a match for him. It is absolutely ridiculous to read the French accounts of the manner in which the strongest Allied Armies were annihilated, without even a battle !!!

“ The fourth fact is, that Bonaparte, though he has given us his own positions, he has not ventured to tell us where the Allies were. If, by going himself in advance of Troyes, he had driven them back upon the Rhine, would he have suppressed so important a fact? We suspect, therefore, that *though the Allies have allowed him to go to Troyes, they, themselves, are nearer Paris than he wishes them* ; and either he is inclosed in a net, as he was before the battle of Leipsic—or *they have taken a northerly position, parallel to his line*. We are inclined to adopt the latter opinion, the more so, as it is admitted in the French papers that the right wing of the Allied Army was at Meaux, only 25 miles from Paris. The advantage of this position is evident, as it secures the communication by sea and with Holland, separates the Netherlands from France, and provides for the junction with Bernadotte, who, by the last British accounts, was advancing towards the Lower Rhine. *It seems, that, as Bonaparte was pressing upon the left of the Allies, they pressed in their turn upon his left, and both were endeavouring to concentrate their forces for a blow, which must be decisive*.

“ Such is the appearance of the respective bold positions of the contending armies, that if the Allies succeed *they will at once cut off Bonaparte from his capital* ; but if he should prove victorious,

he will cut them off from the Lower Rhine. *As rashness, however, is a more decided characteristic of Bonaparte, than of the Allies, we are confident the scale will be turned against him ; as they would not have advanced so far, without feeling themselves in adequate force."*

At length on the memorable day, the 11th of May, the brig Ida, from Rochelle, brought the first glorious news of the entrance of the allies into Paris, and the next day the following short article from the author, appeared in the " Boston Gazette" :—

" All the reports, which had reached us concerning the supposed defection of Austria, may be explained without being wholly discredited. That Austria was averse to the dethronement of Bonaparte, there can be no doubt, from her well known political character, and her interest in the continuation of the Bonapartean dynasty. We have formerly hinted our suspicions, that the Allies had pledged themselves to support Napoleon's son, merely from the circumstance of their not proclaiming sooner the restoration of Louis, which kept the French people in a state of apathy and uncertainty, *mistaken here and in England for their attachment to Napoleon.* We think, however, that by persuasion, intimidation, and other means, the Allies have prevailed so far with Austria, as to co-operate with them *in obtaining possession of Paris*, the result of which is, that the fears which she must have entertained of losing her influence, whenever Paris should fall into their hands, are likely to be realized. It is quite evident, that if the people of Paris, whose *example must operate a change in the whole Empire*, should prefer the Bourbons to the Bonapartean dynasty, the Allies, without violating their previous pledge to Austria, will naturally support the pretensions of the French people, and render every opposition on her part perfectly nugatory. *She will be forced to swim with the tide, and content to share in the benefits of general emancipation."*

The same day, and in the same paper, appeared the following " extempore lines," addressed by the author, in which he, with equal success, predicted the security of American property at Bordeaux, then occupied by the English :—

" Hail, Ocean's ambling daughter, Ida fair,
 The fairest of the watery nymphs, unmatch'd
 In speed and beauty, pride of all thy friends
 Who saw thy birth, and rapid growth, and who
 Beheld thy first essay, with virgin-keel
 To press the main, whose gently yielding waves
 Soon clasp'd thee in their am'rous arms, then rose,
 And on their crest united bore thee up
 Their loveliest Fairy-Queen ! Once more we hail
 And welcome thee back to thy native shore !
 Many a danger hast thou pass'd : of these
 The sea, with all its quicksands, rocks, and storms,
 Was but the least. A giant-foe, whose form,
 Like some huge shadow, is reflected seen
 From ev'ry coast, and on each distant flood,
 Inclos'd thee with his thousand arms, and watch'd
 Thy courses with his thousand eyes : yet thou
 From North to South, from West to East, and back,
 Safe and unhurt, hast pass'd. And tho' thou bring'st
 No foreign stores, no prize, save thy rich self,
 Yet on thy airy steps tread smiling hope
 And joy exuberant, which from afar
 Salute our longing eye and thirsty ear.
 To Freedom's Sons thou Freedom's triumph bring'st,
 And the stern Tyrant's fall. How envious then
 Thy destiny ! The glorious news requir'd
 A messenger as glorious as thyself ;
 And Heav'n, in fav'ring thy escape, has shewn
 Its final choice on thee was fix'd. Come, then,
 And in thy native harbour taste repose !
Fear not ! The treasures thou hast left behind
Shall ne'er be plunder'd by the hostile band,
Which, through proud Gallia's bold invasion, means
To save, not to destroy. Again thou shalt
 Traverse the friendly bosom of the main,
 To thee so faithful ; and when war's hoarse voice
 Is hush'd, and peace unfurls thy snowy sails,
 Thou shalt with ample bounty yet repay
 The parent's care that foster'd thee—the love
 That nurs'd thy infancy, and sent thee forth
 So well protected, on the watery world."

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On the receipt of the official accounts from England, confirming in detail the glorious news brought by the *Ida*, the author thus took his leave of his adversaries and Bonaparte, in the *Boston Gazette*, of June 13 :—

“ At the sound of the name, heretofore appalling, but now harmless and pitiful ; at the mere mention of the singular being, whose word, and whose nod yesterday, as it were, commanded millions of lives, but who to day lives himself only by sufferance, and lives *a lingering death* ; the heart is overpowered with mingled and undéscribable emotions, the mind is lost in a whelming flood of ideas, and the tongue, not daring to trust the utmost strength of language, puts on the fetters of silence and remains in fearful suspense. A few months back, a mere moment in the space of eternity, a mighty conflagration was spreading over all the world ; and yet, while approaching its utmost height, we see it suddenly extinguished by a second universal deluge ; a deluge, which, to increase our special wonder, has left no wrecks, no horrors on its traces, but in the heart of the very furnace, wherein the flames engendered, has deposited the cradle of peace and prosperity ; the noble twins of an almost unexpected birth, who from their rapid and gigantic growth will soon extend their arms from *North to South, and from East to West, embracing every part of the Globe*. A fierce Comet was on the point of consuming this devoted earth, when the sudden breath of Heaven cooled the rage of the invading orb, and swept it far from the line on which it pursued its baleful course ; in an instant it is shivered in fragments, hurled down from its fatal altitude among the old planets, and its intense heat has passed away as a holy and purifying fire. Yes, there is no blasphemy, in calling that a holy and purifying fire, which *purged the earth of restless demagogues and usurping Tyrants—quelled the proud and rebellious spirit, aspiring to a self-government that brought in its train a load of practical evil for every grain of visionary good—allayed and subdued the malignant, factious passions, which, under the pretext of freedom subverted universal liberty—tore off the specious mask from the new-fangled monster, modern philosophy—reconciled the turbulent and disaffected to a regular and salutary government, better adapted to human nature—re-established, on a firmer basis than ever, the ancient order of things under legitimate sovereign pow-*

er—and created another moral and political world from the ruins of the old, placing a sad and painful experience, as an eternal bar to every future impious attempt to pull down the magnificent edifice thus again erected. *The many-headed hydra of the French revolution is crushed forever : its venom has been too keenly felt, and its ungovernable, and all-devouring appetite has been glutted with victims too precious ever to fear its revival, so fatal to the happiness of all. Past sufferings will soon be forgotten ; and the blessings about to be enjoyed will only excite gratitude to that powerful and merciful Disposer of events, who thought fit to chastise us by gratifying for a while our lawless wishes ; then applied a dreadful but lasting remedy to the calamities which grew out of our own pride and ambition.*

“ Our joy is too pure to allow of any unhallowed admixture, arising from the gratification of revenge or vanity ; yet we may be permitted to congratulate ourselves on the signal success of our anticipations, embracing nearly the whole series of the late great events ; not for the purposes of self exultation, or of triumph over the deluded crest-fallen men, whose prophecies were all false, but merely to contrast our hopes and wishes with theirs ; ours, in favour of the common cause of mankind, and theirs, in favour of the oppression of mankind, and, therefore, dishonourable and impious.

“ We have called these creatures men, only by courtesy, and in that spirit of forbearance which has been shown to their humbled leader ; but if we were to arraign them before the strict tribunal of justice, their right to the title might be severely questioned. For, if they be men, of what strange materials are they formed, since they can, while boasting of preeminent freedom, wed their souls to a spirit, at once the most tyrannical and slavish ; and in defiance of virtue, sense, reason and public shame, link themselves by choice to a monster, worshipped from necessity, abandoned from honour, abhorred of mankind, and denounced of Heaven ? No ; it is not in the history of man, that a parallel can be found to their horrid perseverance in self prostitution ; but only in the records of those rebellious, obdurate, and unrepentant beings, who, rather than return to the light of truth, and into the presence of their God, preferred to follow Lucifer to his dismal abode below.”

To finish his career of a political Prophet, our author in the *Palladium* of June 17, 1814, gave the following sketch of "the talents of Bonaparte," which sketch was almost immediately confirmed by Chateaubriand's pamphlet, published in France and touching upon the same subject, as copied, in extracts, into some of the American papers.

"In imitation of the magnanimous conduct of the Allies towards the fallen oppressor of Europe, we shall not drag him forth from the obscurity in which he has taken shelter ; or, by reviewing his moral character, place a mirror before him where he may see all the crimes he is known to have committed, with the poor consolation that many more remain yet undiscovered. But we may be permitted to glance at that part of his character, which is connected with his supposed talents ; and which has been strenuously advocated and generally acknowledged. If we should be found to differ in opinion from a great majority, we can only say, and say with truth, that our present sentiments are of old and unvaried growth, preceding Bonaparte's downfall, and not originating in that human weakness, which changes opinions with the misfortunes of a man once admired.

"The unbounded and despotic power of Bonaparte, which enabled him to humble nation after nation in quick succession, and threw, over all minor defeats and errors, the dazzling mantle of success, preventing the eye of inquiry from a close inspection, was no symptom of his talents, but merely a proof of the energies inherent in France, and of his own adventurous boldness in seizing those energies, and bringing them rapidly and simultaneously into action. But as events have shewn, that this boldness was inconsiderate rashness on his part ; and that by venturing his all at once, though he overwhelmed others for a while, he soon wasted and squandered himself, thereby insuring and accelerating his own ruin ; the conclusion is irresistible, that the very ground, on which his claims to talents are attempted to be established, is the strongest and most prominent on which such claims should be annulled.

"In the character of Statesman, he has given several unequivocal proofs of his incapacity. His invasion of Spain, whose nominal independence, protecting her from the British navy, and enabling her to draw her treasures from her American possessions, rendered her more useful to him, than if she were conquered and under his

absolute and undisguised control, was an unpardonable blindness to his immediate interests, and to his consequent and useless sacrifices ; it was literally killing the goose that laid golden eggs for him, and paying at an extravagant rate for the trouble of killing. His attempt upon Russia, though supported by gigantic preparations and unprecedented means, showing that he was not insensible of the dangers of the contest and of the character of the enemy ; evince nevertheless, his misconception of the moral and physical capacity of Russia, his reluctance to profit by the experience he already had of the talents of her generals and of the prowess of her soldiers, his credulity in the false representations of her national temper and disposition, his premature rage to avenge her interruption of his designs upon Spain, which designs, but for her tacit defiance and menacing attitude, would probably have succeeded ; and finally his extreme impatience, to achieve, by subduing her, the long meditated conquest of the whole continent, terminating in that of Great Britain : all which furnish an evidence not of talents, but of unqualified arrogance, unchecked by foresight and prudence. Aptness in intrigue and corruption, rather reflected by his agents than possessed by himself, formed the sum total of his political wisdom.

“ As a Financier, he stands still lower. In waging a deadly and interminable war against Great Britain, he not only underrated her resources, but overrated his own. He forgot that, in a race not to be given up as long as the parties can breathe, the strongest runner must fall the last ; and though England might be precipitated into the gulf of destruction, she would undoubtedly be preceded by her antagonist. He never thought for a moment that in consuming the means of other nations, he exhausted his own with greater rapidity ; and though the British people complained of their privations, and thus encouraged him to persevere in the delusive hope of subduing them, the true source of these complaints was *their old habit or privilege of complaining* ; while his own people were suffering, in silence, real and serious calamities. His wanton persecution of commerce, the chief sinew of national strength, is another striking instance of his foolish infatuation, which at once cut off his resources abroad, forced him to draw upon the interior stock, without being able to replenish it, and thus, by the very

means he selected, destroyed his darling object. He acted like an inexperienced merchant, if such can be found, who by increasing the outgoings, and reducing the external supplies, expects to improve the capital he inherited ; or like a quack-doctor, who would undertake to cure a patient by bleeding him to death. Indeed Bonaparte could not or would not understand, that the ruin of his adversary was more likely to be accomplished by a superior encouragement of commerce in his own dominions, than by frightening commerce away, and by driving her, sword in hand, upon the wide ocean, where she would be at the mercy of Great Britain. His confined banking system, and the childish notion, that the circulation of specie and absence of paper money were the true criterion of national wealth and prosperity, when the experience of ages has demonstrated that a specie, exclusive of paper, is a proof of national poverty, and that no country ever attained the height of commercial preponderance without paper credit, plainly shew how young and uninformed he was in this important branch of political science. His whole arrangement, or rather derangement of interior fiscal concerns, weak in device, oppressive in execution, and inadequate to the object proposed, exhibits the like features of ignorant and cruel despotism, with scarcely a single favourable exception.

“ As a Legislator, his laws and edicts, always contradicting each other, prompted by sudden impulses, and forced from occasional circumstances into a permanent operation, are mere ebullitions of caprice, and the only credit he might have gained on this score would have come from their speedy abolition. Every foreign merchant who visited France and had to do with Napoleon’s custom-houses and lawyers, and every one had to do with them, will vouch for the truth of these assertions.

“ As a man, there is nothing edifying in Bonaparte’s character, and we have already intimated our intention to spare him on this point. As a hero, there is not a single deed of his, which may shew that either nature or education ever designed him for such. The very attempt to canvass his claims to this distinction would be injustice and an insult to the memory of those who are consecrated as Heroes.

“As a Sovereign, Bonaparte’s qualifications amounted to one unit, which was force. Beyond this he had no idea of governing ; therefore, governed no longer than the force lasted. Neither had he the faculty of attaching his subjects or even his creatures to his person. The only expedient he knew and employed, was sordid interest, which led him into unheard of profusion and extravagance (no monarch ever granted such sweeping salaries to his officers,) offending many, while it reconciled but a few, and that feebly, and served him only in the absence of other stronger temptations, arising from the prospect of favours more wisely distributed. He had no art to inspire his people with that love and confidence which, after all, are the strongest and most lasting links of union between a sovereign and his subjects. He had neither the courage to resist flattery, or hear the truth ; nor the ability of preserving his friends and advisers. He repudiated Josephine, the only friend he had in the world, and discarded Talleyrand, the only adviser that could check his disastrous temerity ; accordingly, his guardian angel at home, mediating between him and the nation, and his protecting genius abroad, shielding him from the united attacks of foreign powers, having both deserted him, his fortune began to decline, and his downfall commenced. His reign produced no other effect but to revive with past recollections the love of the past, to reconcile the people to the sway of the Bourbons, and leave a powerful contrast in favour of the latter.

“Were it necessary further to illustrate, by result and comparisons, our judgment of Bonaparte, in reference to the preceding topics ; we would only say that his failure amply proves his want of abilities, and that Peter and Frederick were successful, because their course over the same ground was totally opposite to his.

“There remains then to Bonaparte but one claim to talent in his military character ; a character, which he could never throw off or disguise for a moment, but which, in the field, cabinet, court, church, or drawing-room, he constantly obtruded on the spectator. Souwarrow and Moreau had pronounced him a great General ; and the opinion of such men would be conclusive, had they seen him contending like themselves against Fortune, and struggling with Adversity, and thus possessed all the materials necessary to

form a fair judgment. As long as the tide of success favoured his course of ambition, his promptitude, activity, boldness, and rashness itself, while of essential service to himself, struck the world with terror, and through a sort of bright artificial atmosphere, exhibited his pigmy figure in the magnified form of a giant ; but the moment he encountered obstruction, and the tide began to turn, these qualities became his bane, and he possessed or at least evinced no others more suitable to the emergency of the times. His invincibility, first shaken by the renowned Beningzen on the fields of Pultusk and Eylau, received another blow at Aspern from the hand of Archduke Charles ; but as he soon recovered, and rose as formidable as ever from these disasters, his reputation for talent rather increased than diminished. It was, therefore, at the dreadful battle of Borodino, the source and cause of all his subsequent misfortunes, that he received the first wound, from which, ever since, he has been dying by inches. It was there, that the venerable Kutuzow, the illustrious fellow soldier of the great Souwarrow, by beating him on the plain, and then entrapping him at Moskow, deprived him for ever of his doubtful invincibility, and of his skill till then scarcely any where questioned. Bonaparte, as if determined from that moment to undeceive even his warmest admirers, soon gave proofs, that he either disdained or was not wise enough to profit by the experience so painfully purchased ; for we find that Kutuzow's plan has been since faithfully followed, and enforced on every occasion with the same invariable success, against the unguarded Bonaparte. The way in which the allies dislodged him from Dresden, is precisely the same in which Kutuzow compelled him to quit Moskow ; and the triple attack they made upon him at Leipzig, is like the triple and scarcely less memorable attack made upon him, on the Berezina, by order of the Russian Veteran.

“ The entrance of the Allies into France, through Switzerland, which rendered the French fortresses useless, is also of the same character : indeed, their uniform manner of conducting the invasion, particularly their bold and decisive march to Paris, which suddenly placed them between this capital and Bonaparte's main army, reminds us strongly of Kutuzow's admirable position after the entrance of the French into Moskow, and of Tchitchagoff's march upon Minsk, which intercepted Bonaparte's main body from Wilna.

“ In short, he not only has been fairly beaten in every encounter, but constantly out-manœuvred and out-generalled ; and it must be one of his most galling reflections, that the Capital, on which his safety depended, was wrested from him with his crown, not so much by a general defeat, as by the superior skill and judgment of his adversaries.

“ It may be urged in his defence, that his means, since the fatal Russian campaign, were greatly reduced, and that he could not well resist the superior forces of the allies. We might, in reply, draw from this very defence conclusions against his former reputation, as it was always with superior forces that he conquered ; we might institute comparisons between him and his antagonists, who, though more inferior to him, than he has since been to them, were more successful in averting their total overthrow ; we might maintain that if he possessed real talents to the extent supposed, his despotic command, united within himself, might more than overbalance the numerical superiority of the allies, directed by many heads ; we might also shew with how much smaller relative means Frederick and Souwarrow triumphed over all their enemies, and achieved exploits worthy of themselves ; but we are willing to concede the plea, and even to confess, that it is precisely on the ground of diminution in his resources, that we predicated all our opinions and expectations, now fully verified, of his final downfall. Great talents alone could redeem his sinking fortunes ; but our conviction that he was irrecoverably lost, is an additional evidence that we were then right, and are so now, in maintaining that he had no such talents. Allowing, however, the utmost latitude of the defence, which may thus be set up for him, we will ask, why, if he knew himself so much weaker, did he act as if he were so much stronger ? Why did he leave so many garrisons in German fortresses, no longer in his power to preserve, and thus deprive himself of numerous and veteran troops, at a most critical moment when they would be wanted to defend his nearer and infinitely more important interests ? If he were inferior in means, why did he stay at Leipzic, as he did at Moskow, instead of retiring behind the Rhine, where, with his unbroken and collected legions, he could have successfully defied, and, perhaps, repelled the allies ? Why did he risk a great battle, under circumstances so confessedly

unfavourable to him? It is in vain to resist the conviction to which these questions lead; but this is not enough. A skilful commander, though he may be unfortunate, generally is able to preserve his army, and to make an honourable retreat. Indeed, it is in a successful retreat that the talents of a great general are the most forcibly displayed. Such was Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest, which is the most precious jewel in his fame. Such was the unprecedented retreat of Souwarrow from Switzerland, a scene of constant triumphs, which imparted to his glory more splendour than all his brilliant victories, and which in fact was alone wanting to complete that glory. Shall we judge by these of the retreats of Bonaparte? They were miserable routs, and ignominious flights. Twice he was defeated, and twice he lost an army. All then we can allow him, is that he was an able general to direct offensive operations; but a very indifferent one to act on the defensive,

"Upon the whole, therefore, we are decidedly of opinion, that this no longer formidable man, whose life we venture to predict will end in madness, unless cut off by the violence of others, *will descend to the grave stripped of the only reputation he can claim, the reputation of a General; and ere long, his military abilities, so long the theme of universal praise and admiration, will sink in public estimation, to the level of mediocrity*, and instead of a "supereminent," he will be considered only a common being. During the whole of his retrograde progress, the battle of Lutzen was the only one that seemed again to elevate him; but the battle of Bautzen which succeeded it, and where, though doubly superior in numbers, he made but a feeble impression upon the enemy, soon dissipated the illusion which revived in many the conviction of his great talents adequate to save him. We still think highly of the battle of Lutzen; and on account of this battle alone, have allowed him that portion of talent which we confined to his offensive career."

We now conclude our collection, in the firm reliance, that we have fully redeemed our pledge to our readers, in having given them the most curious, instructive, and amusing series of successful prophecies that ever appeared from any political writer whatever.



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